The National Interest

Georgia has reached a pivotal point in its political development. Having established an image as a reform model in the non-Baltic former Soviet Union since (now former) President Mikheil Saakashvili came to power, events in early November of this year brought into sharp relief the volatility of Georgia’s politics and the relative immaturity of its democratic institutions. The government’s response to the demonstrators who took to the streets was a particular shock. Images of security forces using water cannons and tear gas against their own citizens did not square with the understanding of the peaceful Rose Revolution.

In the aftermath of the mass protests and nine-day state of emergency put in place by the authorities, critics have been quick to point out the flaws in the Georgian system. While some of this analysis has been too quick to write Georgia off, it is undeniable the country faces real problems. Georgian institutions have experienced a political trauma that calls into question the society’s ability to consolidate its democracy. And without a clear recommitment to democratic values and practices, starting with Saakashvili, it is entirely possible that Georgia’s democratic experiment could fail.

At such times of acute political stress it is useful to take a step back and put developments in perspective. Freedom House has evaluated democratic development in independent Georgia for a decade and a half, since the collapse of the Soviet Union. An overview of developments in Georgia through the lens of Freedom House analysis, which offers a country-specific and regional context, can provide a useful frame of reference for looking at recent events.

Recently, Freedom House findings have been invoked by supporters and critics alike in Georgia. Such invocations from diverse quarters are possible because Georgia’s record over the past four years is mixed. This fact isn’t particularly surprising, given the difficult legacy the country was saddled with and its level of development at the time of the Rose Revolution.

Meanwhile, the debate over the country’s fate has been so impassioned—and in many ways disproportionate to its size—because Georgia is viewed as one of the rare examples in the former Soviet Union of a country capable of achieving democratic reform.

In fact, the only other instance of meaningful reform in the region apart from Georgia is post-Orange Revolution Ukraine, which is slowly making headway on a number of democracy indicators but very much remains a work in progress. To put this progress into perspective, consider that it has become clear over the course of the past three elections that power in Ukraine is granted and taken away on the basis of elections that are largely free and fair, and whose results are respected by winners and losers alike. This is no small accomplishment in the former Soviet Union, where incumbents rule by zero-sum politics and power is rarely rotated. Compared with, say Russia, recent developments highlight the political reform distance Ukraine has put between itself and Russia’s smothering “Putinism.”

For these reasons, in the international context Georgia’s achievements over the last several years are significant because so little meaningful democratic reform has occurred in the region, where brutal, controlling neo-Soviet politics have been on the ascent from Belarus to Azerbaijan to Uzbekistan. Russia has distinguished itself over the period since the Rose Revolution by thoroughly dismantling its own inchoate democratic institutions. The profoundly flawed process for the just-held Duma elections epitomizes the degree to which any semblance of democratic accountability has been shunted aside in today’s Russia.

The Kremlin’s heavy hand has made Georgia’s efforts at reform a far more challenging enterprise. The blanket blockade imposed last year by Russia (now in effect seemingly in perpetuity)—which seals the border between the two countries to trade and transportation, and bars sea and air travel—and the ongoing Kremlin-inspired mischief in Georgia’s breakaway territories are among the manifold efforts at destabilization. Not surprisingly, the recent upheaval in Georgia has revealed a good deal of Schadenfreude in the Russian media, whose tightly controlled broadcasts today represent a direct window into Kremlin’s thinking.

So what are the main features of the current landscape in Georgia and what does this suggest for the future?

The most glaring features of Georgia’s unconsolidated democracy were exposed in early November. The country’s executive dominated the political landscape and displayed an increasing unwillingness to engage political opposition and civil society. Saakashvili admittedly is a complex figure who has demonstrated an authoritarian streak; his leadership also pulled Georgia from the post-Soviet doldrums in which it was mired until Eduard Shevardnadze’s departure from the political scene.

Meanwhile, Georgia’s opposition parties have yet to distinguish themselves on the political stage or offer any sort of meaningful policy alternatives to the current government. Much of the opposition has also shown itself to be irresponsible and sometime reckless. The estrangement between the government and opposition reinforces a discourse that reveals the immaturity of Georgian politics.

The current government’s achievement of a number of noteworthy reforms deserves recognition, especially in the context of the barren reform landscape in the wider region. Freedom House findings identify a number of areas of progress, including reforms in law enforcement, the state bureaucracy, the election process and the country’s universities, where safeguards have been implemented to combat entrenched corruption. Georgia still enjoys a capable civil society sector, which has been an important and positive feature of Georgian society pre-dating the Saakashvili era. Civil society represents an especially valuable resource to be supported for enhancing democracy’s prospects going forward.

The analysis also suggests that the roots of Georgia’s democratic institutions are shallow. Weaker areas of performance are found in the country’s rule of law and the capacity and independence of the judiciary, which requires priority reform attention. Georgia’s media is likewise given middling evaluations in Freedom House analysis. With the controversy over Imedi’s closure in the aftermath of the November state of emergency, the media sector is in jeopardy of sliding backward.

Saakashvili, who resigned the presidency in order to be constitutionally eligible to run in January, must set a new tone for his country’s politics. It must be emphasized that while the January elections are important, they are only one piece of a far larger puzzle that needs to be assembled to ensure the roots of democracy grow and are enduring.

Given the pivotal point at which Georgia finds itself, there is a role to play for the community of democratic states in whose interest it is to have a stable, durable democracy in the Caucasus. In fact, one conclusion that can be drawn from the Freedom House assessments is that some supporters in the West were too quick to declare democracy’s success in Georgia in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution. A number of supporters also fell into the trap of focusing support on a single personality rather than developing durable institutions. Instead of offering premature plaudits for a job well done, the West could have done Georgian democracy a favor by being constructively critical quite some time ago. In this context, the upheaval of November 2007 should be viewed as a warning sign. To prevent further backsliding, the United States and European Union should recommit themselves to providing needed support for Georgia’s democratic institutions.

Recent events have raised the political stakes in Georgia, which has entered a new, uncertain phase of its development. How the country’s leadership responds will signal whether Georgia squanders the opportunity offered by the democratic opening of four years ago or turns a corner and advances toward the ranks of mature democracies.

Christopher Walker is director of studies at Freedom House.

Inside Track: Beacon of Democracy or Khachapuri Republic?

by Lincoln Mitchell

So how did we get from the days of wine, roses and khachapuri in late 2003 and early 2004 to where we are today in Georgia?

Immediately after the crackdown on November 7, 2007, the Western media, in addition to the inevitable puns about roses, thorns and withering, offered two different narratives. The first, perhaps best seen in Anne Applebaum’s piece in The Washington Post, was that democracy had failed in Georgia partially because of wrongheaded U.S. policies. The second was that this was a mistake, but otherwise things were going well in Georgia and if the January 5 elections went well, democracy in Georgia would be back on track. Interestingly, this latter narrative seems to be in the ascendancy and seems to reflect US policy. The truth lies somewhere in between and is worth thinking about.

First, I think that the post-Rose Revolution Government of Georgia has accomplished a lot, which some of our speakers have recognized. They have fought corruption in government and business. Foreign assistance has actually been used to rebuild Georgia, and stopped ending up in individual bank accounts. Laws have been passed to streamline business procedures with the hopes of luring more foreign investment. In mid-2004, Aslan Abashidze, the criminal leader of Ajara, fled to Russia under pressure from the newly revitalized government. Cities, notably Tbilisi and Batumi, have begun to look noticeably cleaner, busier and more modern as the economy has slowly improved. These are real accomplishments for which the Georgian government deserves credit. And they’ve done in it in the shadow of, shall we say, a very difficult neighbor.

The Georgian government has argued that they have prioritized state building—not democracy—during these years. I think this is an argument made of convenience that creates a false dichotomy between these two ideas. A government as popular and competent as Saakashvili’s in its first few years would only have been made stronger by doing things more democratically with a little more attention paid to process.

Second, I think a great deal of Georgia’s strategic import is tied in to its democratic development. A failure of democracy in Georgia is a failure for a U.S. and European policy that goes far beyond Georgia. If democracy fails in Georgia, it will be hard to make the argument that democracy can succeed in any non-democratic country. On the other hand, success for democracy in Georgia breathes life into U.S. democracy assistance policies and convinces people that the spread of democracy has not come to an end.

I believe there is still hope for democracy in Georgia. Four years of better elections, less corruption and a public commitment to democracy by the government are buttressed by widespread agreement in Georgia that the future lies with the West—and that means democracy. While these are far from guarantees of success, they do help and should not be overlooked.

But the development of democracy in Georgia has been decidedly mixed since the early days of the Rose Revolution. Constitutional amendments were pushed through in 2004, concentrating power in the president’s hands more than ever before, giving the president the right to dissolve parliament and weakening the powers of the legislative branch.

The judiciary never achieved full independence either, as the government continued to dominate it. Additionally, the spirit of democracy was conspicuously absent from the new Georgia. Media was less free. The parliament, once a place of lively debate, became dominated by the president’s party and far less independent. Leaders of the political opposition were frequently accused of being parties to Russian plots to destabilize Georgia and ridiculed by the president and government for their weakness.

In 2006, the government manipulated the electoral system for local elections, ensuring that the ruling party would dominate local legislatures. Later that year, the government again changed the constitution so that the president and parliament would be elected on the same day. This was broadly seen as an effort to ensure that the still-popular President Saakashvili could provide coattails to the unpopular parliamentary leadership of his party.

However, the actions of the Georgian government described above only tell a limited part of the story. It is also important to look at the actions of Georgia’s biggest and most important ally, the United States.

Since the Rose Revolution, the failure of the U.S. government to challenge the erosion of Georgian democracy has become increasingly conspicuous and troubling. Additionally, democracy assistance in Georgia has changed. Civil society organizations, which might have provided a balance to the powerful government, received less money. Instead, support went to strengthening the Georgian state—an important goal, but not one that helped democracy in Georgia. Georgia is a country that is very pro-American; politicians and ordinary people care a lot about what the United States does and says. The U.S. policy of praising Georgian accomplishments in other areas but not criticizing the increasingly clear shortcomings in the democracy area led the Georgian government to believe that they could move further away from democracy without consequences.

So they did.

In short, the United States acted as an enabler as Georgian democracy slipped further and further away.

Where then do we go from here, and how can we help Georgian democracy get back on track?

For the future of Georgian democracy, January 6 is more important than January 5. There are three possible outcomes to the election, in reverse order of likelihood: an outright win by one of the opposition candidates, a runoff or a first round win by Saakashvili. If it is one of the first two, that changes a few things. If Saakashvili does win this election, which seems pretty likely, there will be two directions open to him. The first is to tell his people and the world that he has now survived a test of popularity, renewed his mandate and does not need to brook any opposition or criticism. The second will be to see the previous months as a humbling experience and redouble his efforts to move Georgia towards a strong and meaningful democracy. I fear that the first is the more likely direction, but the role of the United States should be to push Saakashvili towards the second direction and to help him move forward accordingly.

There are five specific ways that the United States can do this:

Support institutions, not individuals: Saakashvili’s outsized personality has made it very hard to separate Georgia’s democratic aspirations from those of its leader. His intellect, humor, passion, courage and language skills were particularly appealing in the United States, where they were reinforced by a familiarity with American culture and contributed to a strong personal bond between the presidents of the two countries. This bond was solidified during Bush’s 2005 visit to Georgia, where the two presidents feasted on Georgian food late into the night and Bush briefly went on stage to join the dancers who had come to entertain the party. Democracy rarely evolves simply because a democrat gets elected, yet U.S. policy in Georgia seemed to reflect this approach. American assistance in Georgia should instead refocus on supporting the democratic development of institutions inside and outside the state, including government departments, local and national legislatures, civil society and political parties.

Reinvigorate civil society: Since the Rose Revolution, civil society has been considerably weaker than under the previous regime. This is partially because a number of civil society leaders have moved into the government or parliament, and partially because there are more jobs in the private sector than before, but it is also substantially due to the United States reorienting its democracy assistance support in Georgia. By reducing support to civil society organizations, Washington has contributed to the withering of a key component of democracy. Stronger civil society organizations could have helped to provide a check on the government, something parliament is not constitutionally able to do and which the increasingly less independent and critical media has been unable to do since the Rose Revolution. Because of the weakened civil society, each time democracy was cut a little bit, there was little cohesive and visible response. If the U.S. government does nothing else in Georgia, they should substantially increase support for civil society there.

Distinguish between reform and democratizing: Georgia’s government has succeeded in passing a broad array of reform legislation. They have reduced bureaucratic hurdles for those seeking to open a business, improved Georgia’s business climate, made rational and necessary budget decisions, invested in the country’s infrastructure and generally improved the quality of governance. This is not, however, the same as strengthening democracy. Moreover, the way in which many of these reforms have occurred—with limited dialogue, parliamentary debate and public input—has contributed to growing resentment of the government among Georgians. Strengthening democracy means increasing participation and accountability in all phases of governance and allowing for free elections at the legislative and policymaking levels. It does not simply mean passing reform legislation that is westward looking and improving the business climate. The United States should continue to support and applaud the reforms which the Georgian government has undertaken, but this must evaluated separately from the question of the direction and development of Georgia’s democracy.

Don’t overpromise: This is a basic rule of politics at all levels, but one which both the Georgian and Americans broke with regards to democracy in Georgia. Saakashvili’s weakness for overblown rhetoric has caused him to overstate his accomplishments and consistently make unrealistic promises. Saakashvili has delivered the best democracy in the region, but has promised his people Plato’s Republic on the Black Sea. The gap between the expectations to which this rhetoric contributed and the reality of life in Saakashvili’s Georgia for ordinary people was a major factor contributing to the size and vehemence of the demonstrations in early November. Similarly, the rhetoric and actions of the United States overstated the degree of the democratic changes in Georgia.

Don’t get spun: The United States should be more rigorous in evaluating the development of Georgia’s democracy. Verbal commitments to democracy by the government, no matter how eloquent and how good the English, should not obscure problems with Georgian democracy. Unfortunately, this has been the case in recent years. The Georgian government is exceptionally good at presenting itself both at the individual level and through the media. As a result, things like a well articulated speech in the United States by Saakashvili or a western media campaign have taken on far more significance than they should. In the future, Washington should base its democracy policy in Georgia on the actual state of democracy there, not just the words of its leadership. For example, Saakashvili’s recent comments that “I do not want to be the president of a country that limits mass media and that declares emergency rule” or that “I would like everyone to know that each baton hit on our citizens was also a hit on me and the tear-gas that the police used made me cry as well” should not be taken as evidence of Saakashvili’s contrition.

Lastly, the big winner in recent weeks in Georgia has been Vladimir Putin. The visible shortcomings of democracy and chaos in Georgia are exactly what the Russians would like to see there. There is little doubt that many in Russia would like to see Saakashvili fail. This does not, however, mean that domestic opponents of Saakashvili are somehow Russian operatives. Some may be, but clearly most are not. The evidence used by the Georgian government has been, in many cases, quite flimsy. The reality of the Russian threat should not be used to excuse democratic shortcomings. Success of genuine democracy in Georgia is the most powerful message Saakashvili and Georgia can send to their northern neighbor and we need to help them do that.

Lincoln Mitchell is the Arnold A. Saltzman Assistant Professor in the Practice of International Politics at Columbia University.

Rapid Reaction: Ghosts in the Room

by Nikolas K. Gvosdev

What will be the trajectory for Georgia in the run-up to and the immediate aftermath of its presidential and parliamentary elections in Janaury?

No discussion can take place without acknowledging that events in Georgia are occurring against a larger backdrop. The “freedom agenda” of the Bush Administration has run out of momentum, with success stories from Lebanon to Kyrgyzstan turning into disappointments. It also did not help matters for Georgia that President Saakashvili’s decision to crack down on the opposition, to remove an opposition television station from the airwaves and a declaration of a temporary state of emergency took place alongside events in Pakistan, making comparisons between Saakashvili and Pervez Musharraf—and the nature of U.S. support for both Georgia and Pakistan—inevitable, among them the continued American predisposition to support leaders and personalities in place of processes and institutions.

One reason that Musharraf enjoyed the level of support he did in Washington was the sense that he was better positioned to carry out reform and to assist the United States in the “war on terror” than previous “democratic” politicians. A preference for strong presidential leadership in Georgia—even at the expense of democracy—has been reinforced because of the Ukrainian experience of the last two years. Ukraine by all indicators is more democratic than Georgia, and has held a series of highly competitive elections. However, its ability to forge coherent, effective governments in light of its decisions to decentralize power among several centers as part of the move to a parliamentary system has called into question the effectiveness of Ukraine to carry out continued reforms and to keep the country on a solidly pro-Western path.

But the recent Duma elections in Russia point to a different trend—the dangers of the creation of a hyper-presidential system where institutional checks and balances are eroded.

Given that most Georgian politicians support the country’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community, one cannot argue (as one sometimes hears with regard to Ukraine) that a victory for forces that oppose Saakshvili would deliver the country into the hands of Moscow. Is this a case, therefore, where the United States can and should insist on compliance with all democratic norms, safe in the knowledge that, unlike in Ukraine or further afield—say the experience of the Palestinian elections—that an electoral defeat for Saakashvili’s forces could both strengthen democracy while not compromising the country’s geopolitical orientation?

The Bush Administration needs the appearance of success in Georgia. We’ll see what happens in January.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev is editor of The National Interest.