The Ukraine-Russia Energy Crisis
by Dimitri K. Simes
01.08.2009
Factories in southern Europe cut their production and ordinary cities began to lose their heat. After the cutoff of Russian gas supplies through Ukraine, German Chancellor Angela Merkel is quite right to state “searching for the causes is not the first priority. The first priority is for gas to reach Bulgaria, Serbia and Bosnia again.” But she is also right to observe that once the immediate crisis is over, hopefully via the deployment of European Union monitors at Ukrainian transit stations, it will be essential to think seriously about “consequences for European policy.”
Unfortunately, so far there has been little analysis about the underlying causes of the Russian/Ukrainian gas-price dispute, which clearly goes beyond commerce alone. All parties—including not only Russia and Ukraine, but also the EU and the United States—share blame for a situation that has deteriorated into an international emergency.
The divided and dysfunctional government in Kiev acted in a truly delusional fashion, assuming that it could pursue a hostile policy toward Russia (or at a minimum a policy they knew Russia considered hostile), and still expect to get Russian gas at a heavily subsidized rate. During the first gas conflict with Ukraine in 2006, the Kremlin made abundantly clear that it was not prepared to accept any such arrangement. Yet President Viktor Yushchenko, despite some hesitation on the part of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, not only insisted on bringing Ukraine into NATO as soon as possible, but sided fully with Georgia during its August war with Russia. Moreover, as a commission of the Ukrainian parliament, the Rada, has established, Yushchenko repeatedly authorized secret Ukrainian military assistance to the Georgian army. The Russian government claims that most Russian combat aircraft destroyed in the conflict were hit by Ukrainian-made anti-aircraft missiles, crewed by Ukrainian advisers. The Ukrainian government is entitled to determine its own foreign policy, but would be reckless to assume that Russia would provide multibillion dollar subsidies to an adversary. . . .
To read the rest of the blog post, click here or visit Subjective Evaluation, Dimitri K. Simes’s blog.
10.28.09
One doesn’t need to be a Russian domestic radical or a foreign Russophobe to see major flaws in the way Russia is ruled. The population, however, is satisfied with the status quo, as long as they reap the benefits of the semiauthoritarian capitalist system. Yet Russians prefer clarity to mystery, and with rumors of a power struggle between Putin and Medvedev, the question is how long can Russia hold fast?
08.20.09
A scathing domestic dispute over health care is no reason for Obama to abandon his foreign-policy responsibilities. If he doesn't make hard choices soon—on everything from immigration to Iran—he may be a one-term president.
08.10.09
A year later, too many still refuse to accept that Mikheil Saakashvili behaved recklessly in his conflict with Russia.
06.04.09
The president’s Cairo speech made nice soundings on Arab-Israeli peace. But if Obama really wants to accomplish something, he needs to get tough on Israeli settlements.
05.15.09
The Cheney family’s attacks on Obama are a nasty distraction and damaging the GOP. Instead, Republicans should offer new ideas to challenge the president’s.
04.27.09
Since the end of the cold war, American foreign policy toward Russia has been tinged with triumphalism and dismissive of Russian interests. Acknowledging that a country has separate aims does not mean we cannot work toward common goals. There are many issues, such as Iran, Afghanistan and North Korea, on which we need Russian cooperation.