Some of the rhetoric that the U.S. and NATO bandied about in 1999 to justify the Kosovo operation may be coming back to haunt us in the wake of the 2008 Ossetian war.

Russia has claimed that its mandate from the 1992 Sochi agreement to “keep the peace” gives it the right to take whatever measures are necessary to secure South Ossetia. But this can be interpreted to mean that Russia has the right to strike targets in Georgia proper on the grounds that Georgia’s warfighting abilities must be degraded—similar to the NATO rationale in 1999 for hitting targets in Serbia itself, not just Serbian units in Kosovo.

Russia is also utilizing the “loss of sovereignty” argument that was advanced against Serbia in 1999—that Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia which seemed to target civilians has produced such a negative reaction among Ossetians who claim they can no longer live under Georgian rule. So, the argument is that Tbilisi has forfeited its right to exercise sovereignty over South Ossetia just as Serbia supposedly lost its sovereign rights over Kosovo.

And whether the West, and particularly the U.S., buys this or not is no longer the issue. Moscow doesn’t seem to care whether we accept these comparisons, just as we didn’t care about Moscow’s opinion on Kosovo final status. We can either try to fight it—which we don’t seem to want to do—or we will have to accept it de facto—which is where things seem to be headed, at least given the tenor of the French peace mission, which wants a restoration of the August 6 status quo—which for all intents and purposes is a Russian victory and a Georgian defeat.
A final and sobering note of comparison. The 1999 Kosovo war soured U.S.-Russia relations and prevented cooperation that might have nipped al-Qaeda in the bud in Afghanistan prior to 9/11. The Ossetian war today is going to torpedo any effort to restart the U.S.-Russia partnership—and what consequences might result?

Posted by Nikolas Gvosdev at 08/11/2008 11:14:46 AM |