LEON HOLLERMAN's preceding account of Japan's global strategy makes it easier to talk about what remains a conceptually elusive and controversial phenomenon: Japanese international power. The ``headquarters nation'' idea explains much.  The description of Japan's ``adversarial investment'' is timely since it has already become much more significant than what, five years ago, Peter Drucker very usefully defined as ``adversarial trade.''  Hollerman's account also prompts intriguing questions: What will Japan's ``outflanking strategy'' ultimately lead to?  Does the campaign to create a global economic headquarters country constitute a viable policy?  Is it the actual intention of Japan's political elite to run the world in times of peace?  If so, can it be sure of the consent of the world, and especially of the United States?

Let us first make the reasonable assumption that the answer to the last question is no.  A new set of questions then emerges: Are Japan's strategists gamblers?  Are the members of Hollerman's ``collusive oligopoly'' accountable to anyone?

We can safely say that Japan's political elite includes very few gamblers.  Many businessmen have observed that Japanese organizations are extremely risk-averse, and psychologists/anthropologists have been struck by the degree to which Japanese in charge of anything try to cater for every calculable contingency.  My own observations confirm that the unpredictable scares the Japanese to an extraordinary extent.