Another concern is how the six-party talks will influence the relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK), which has been strained in recent years. Some in South Korea believe that the United States has now adopted a more positive and constructive engagement with the North, which may boost America's political standing there, ease strains between the Blue House and White House, and dampen some of the anti-Americanism in the run-up to this year's presidential election in South Korea.

Some conservative elements in the South, however, caution that a nuclear deal with North Korea may cause the Roh Moo-hyun Administration to prematurely celebrate the amity between the two Koreas and provide excessive benefits to Pyongyang without insisting on reciprocal measures. Such a reaction could result in South Korea further lowering its defenses, both psychologically and militarily, against a country that still poses a severe threat. If that happens, it would cause more heartburn in the U.S.-ROK alliance.

So is this a good deal for the United States? The better question to ask is whether this deal has the potential to promote U.S. national security, after carefully reviewing all other available options.

There is no doubt that eliminating the Kim Jong-il regime would be highly desirable; he's a brutal dictator who presides over the world's largest political prison. But regime change by military means is neither a realistic nor attractive option, and there is little evidence that regime change by internal putsch is anything more than wishful thinking, with the added uncertainty as to whether the next "Dear Leader" would be any better than the current one.

Much depends on how this all plays out, but on balance, the deal has the potential to enhance U.S. national security.

A large reason is that the six-party talks are about more than curtailing North Korea's nuclear ambitions, as important as that objective is. What's really at stake here is the vigor of our alliances, the future of northeast Asia, America's stature and standing in east Asia, and our global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. Again, depending on how this all plays out, more actively engaging North Korea in the six-party talks may shore up our positions across the board.

The February 13 joint statement locks the North Koreans a little more firmly into a diplomatic process that promises to bring greater reliability and less uncertainty to the security situation in northeast Asia and, at the same time, to slowly integrate North Korea into the most economically dynamic region in the world. Conversely, it makes it marginally more difficult for North Korea to walk away from the negotiating table, resume its threatening behavior and maintain its isolation. And the joint statement means that the expectations of the other members of the six-party talks have all been raised slightly. These are intangibles, but they should not be underestimated.

They should not be overestimated, either. The situation is incrementally better today than it was previously, but the final answer will depend on how many more "increments" are taken and how quickly.

Another point to raise is whether the deal is verifiable and enforceable. In theory, yes. In practice, we don't yet know. What we do know is that the negotiations over verification and compliance are going to be contentious. In fact, we've some indication of that already. A Korean Central News Agency report announcing the February 13 joint statement claimed there would be only a "temporary suspension of its nuclear facilities", contrary to the North's pledge in the joint statement to "shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment" its nuclear facilities. This same news report also claimed that the other parties agreed to provide economic and energy assistance to the North before it dismantled its nuclear facilities, again contrary to the terms of the joint statement.

A pertinent question to ask is: How much certainty do we need in order to have confidence that the North's entire nuclear-weapons program has been fully captured? Under the terms of the joint statement, the North will have to "discuss a list of all its nuclear programs" and then allow the IAEA to monitor their nuclear dismantlement (or presumably removal from the country). The very idea that there needs to be a discussion at all suggests that Pyongyang sees this process as a further negotiation, and not a mere recital or inventorying of its nuclear facilities.

At issue is not whether North Korea can be trusted to keep its part of any bargain-it can't. Rather, the challenge is to craft reciprocal steps so that at any point in this process the United States is not in a worse position than it would be otherwise should North Korea start backsliding.

Even so, it is doubtful that any negotiation will end with us feeling 100 percent confident that the North has revealed all of its nuclear facilities, technology and fissile material. So how much uncertainty can we live with? How much is too much? During the arms-control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, one standard that was cited was whether any uncertainty (or undetectable cheating) would be "militarily significant." In the North Korean context, would a discrepancy of three or four bombs worth of fissile material be militarily significant? Absolutely. Three or four grams worth? Probably not. But what about an amount in between? This could be a very tough call. And it is likely that different members of the six-party talks would view this uncertainty differently, with various degrees of alarm or complacence. It is important to keep in mind that, at the end of the day, this will be a political, not a technical, judgment.

Yet another concern raised is whether this agreement enhances or detracts from our efforts to stem proliferation and promote non-proliferation. Although proliferation is often characterized as a global problem, the reality is that there are only a handful of countries we are truly worried about at any one time. Obviously, North Korea, along with Iran, is at the top of the list.

A North Korea that completely surrenders its entire nuclear-weapons program and receives its rewards according to the terms of the joint statement could serve as encouragement for Iran to negotiate the surrender of its nuclear-weapons program. It would be proof positive that the United States could abandon regime change, reconcile itself to a diplomatic solution and assist in the re-integration of a pariah state into the global community.

However, there are two factors that undercut this more optimistic scenario. First, it is likely that the time frame in which North Korea denuclearizes, if that happens at all, would be at odds with the time frame for an Iranian decision on whether to produce enough enriched uranium for nuclear devices. In other words, technical progress in the Iranian program may present Tehran with a critical choice well before the North Korea case plays itself out. Under that scenario, North Korea would not really be relevant.

Second, it seems more likely that Tehran will determine the future of its nuclear program according to whether a nuclear arsenal advances its national security, enhances its status or satisfies important domestic constituencies, compared to the alternatives available. Factors at home and in the region loom much larger in that assessment than the situation with North Korea. Consistent with this more pessimistic judgment is the recent testimony of the Director of National Intelligence, Admiral McConnell, who stated that, "We assess that Tehran is determined to develop nuclear weapons."

Nevertheless, it would still be an important victory for U.S. non-proliferation efforts if North Korea surrenders its entire nuclear-weapons program.

But it would be a more lasting victory if two additional steps take place after the North's denuclearization. First, it is in Washington's long-term interest to strengthen the IAEA, whose inspection system is really "where the rubber hits the road." A comprehensive verification and compliance regime for North Korea that enhances the status of the IAEA would be very helpful.

Second, if North Korea gives up its nuclear programs, its subsequent but gradual integration into the regional and global economy and the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with its former adversaries would powerfully demonstrate that countries can improve their security not by developing nuclear weapons, but by abandoning their nuclear ambitions. It would serve as a very useful example for others to follow.

The danger for the non-proliferation regime is if the nuclear deal does not move forward, but instead gradually grinds to a halt because of endless wrangling over access to this or that site. If North Korea emerges from this diplomatic process with its nuclear-weapons program intact and with the other members of the six-party talks unwilling to impose tough penalties on Pyongyang, then we risk undermining the NPT, the IAEA and global non-proliferation efforts.

Mitchell B. Reiss is vice provost for International Affairs at the College of William & Mary. From 2003-2005 he served as director of Policy Planning at the State Department.

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