In addition, Al-Qaeda has announced publicly that it is placing new emphasis on winning the war in Afghanistan, and events on the ground clearly reflect that determination.

In the Middle East and Islamic world, one may expect more of the same, perhaps in more places, over the next five years, rather than any single, spectacular strike against American facilities there. From the viewpoint of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, its strategy in the Middle East is working reasonably well, and needs only be continued to achieve the objective of forcing withdrawal of most American and allied forces from the region.

Al-Qaeda has certainly been watching with interest the establishment of a new Islamist regime in Somalia. In addition to Iraq and Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda may now believe that its presence in the geostrategically vital Horn of Africa may be significantly upgraded. The hinge of Somalia may offer new possibilities for it to penetrate Saudi Arabia as well as the entire Arabian peninsula, and indeed of much of the African continent.

At the same time, there is no doubt that Al-Qaeda prime's strategic capabilities have been significantly degraded since 9/11. To quantify the unquantifiable--and on a scale of 0-10 with zero equaling "not at all" and ten "totally", or "virtually certain"--informed estimates suggest a 6-7 reduction of Al-Qaeda's global capability during the last five years. During the same period, however, an army of potential jihadists has been created inside the U.S. prison system. As these jihadists are released into the larger society, Al-Qaeda may regain some of its former capability. It would certainly have available a new army of potential American domestic-terrorist operatives.

On an international scale, Al-Qaeda prime remains dangerous. It, or one of the affiliates it has inspired, remains capable of mounting another major attack within the borders of the United States. Those borders are of course poorly secured, especially the U.S.-Canadian border. Canada today is home to countless potential terrorists who would not find movement into the United States a major problem.

In fact, within, say, the next five years, again on a scale of 0-10, informed professional estimates suggest that the probability of a major terrorist attack inside the United States is close to an eight on the same ten-point scale. Of course, the sophistication of such attacks, the amount of possible radioactive or biological dispersion into the atmosphere, and the sorts of unconventional weapons that might be used, remain wild cards. Currently, Al-Qaeda almost certainly does not have the capability to mount any major operation in the United States. But there are an almost unlimited number of potential targets. And five years is a long time.

In this regard, it is often assumed that any Al-Qaeda operation would necessarily be designed to achieve a greater body count than 9/11. This may not be true. Whatever else it is, terrorism is psychological warfare. Recall the enormous psychological impact of the anthrax attacks, and their ability to cause mass hysteria and paralyze the federal government, despite the fact that only a handful of victims died. The fact is that Al-Qaeda may now not consider an enormous body count to be necessary, when nearly the same societal impact might be obtained by using a stinger missile (for example) to knock down one civilian aircraft landing or taking off, or placing a few bombs in different malls around the country, or (as was planned in 2000 for the Radisson Hotel in Amman, Jordan) by placing poison in a luxury hotel's circulation system. In any such case, public hysteria would explode, and a significant part of the U.S. infrastructure would grind to a standstill. Certainly, any such attacks would not require enormous sophistication, deployment of nuclear weapons, or the training of a large number of operatives. Precisely for those reasons, they would probably be much harder for law enforcement to detect. But their effect would in all probability be similar to those of a dirty bomb or the use of chemical or biological weapons. Hence their possible attractiveness. In particular, the U.S. subway and rail system, especially the Washington-New York railroad link, offers a very inviting soft target that could be hit effectively without the use of the most sophisticated weaponry. In the War on Terror, the United States remains highly vulnerable.

Al-Qaeda is patient. Eight years passed between the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and 9/11. Since 9/11, only five years have elapsed. For Al-Qaeda the movement, that is merely a moment in time. Al-Qaeda may well believe that it is right on schedule as far as mounting another major terrorist strike in the United States is concerned.

Meanwhile, operations by Al-Qaeda or its grassroots imitators have not slowed since 9/11. Such operations have stretched from Jordan to Saudi Arabia and on through Indonesia, Spain and the United Kingdom. Clearly, Al-Qaeda and its imitators remain very much alive.

Sleep well, sweet prince. And pleasant dreams.

1Hilaire Belloc, The Great Heresies (Rockford, IL: Tan Publishers, Inc., 1991), pp. 73-76.
2Rami G. Khouri, "Bush's Fantasy Foreign Policy", which can be found at http://www.tompaine.com, October 11, 2005.

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