That Taiwan succeeded in preserving its independence from the side
that emerged victorious in the Chinese civil war has been due mainly
to the United States. America, though indirectly, continued to be
involved in that war even after its termination on the mainland in
1949. It both protected and bolstered Taiwan. Episodic military
clashes in the Taiwan Strait occurred until the de facto suspension
of the civil war in the 1970s--a suspension attained by direct
U.S.-China talks initiated under President Nixon and later formalized
through the normalization of U.S.-China relations under President
Carter. The resulting arrangement was genuinely creative, for it
enabled the winning side to acquiesce to the de facto partition of
China as the transitional outcome of the civil war without accepting
it as a permanent de jure reality.

That sensible accommodation was made possible by the acceptance on
both sides of the intricate formula whereby (1) the United States
acknowledged that in the view both of the mainland and of Taiwan
there is only one China; and (2) the United States affirmed that it
expects the issue of reunification to be resolved peacefully (and
that U.S. national interest would be engaged if it should be
otherwise); whereas (3) the Chinese reiterated that reunification is
an internal Chinese matter, to be attained by whatever means China
deems appropriate, though their preference is also for a peaceful
resolution.

Once that hurdle had been traversed it followed that the officially
recognized government of China had to be the one that governs 98
percent of the Chinese people. And it also followed that Taiwan could
not be recognized as a separate "sovereign" state, though the United
States could maintain practical and functional ties with it. Such
ties were then formally legislated by the U.S. Congress in the
"Taiwan Relations Act" of 1980, which regularized U.S. relations with
Taiwan without defining it as a sovereign state. In effect, the
outcome of the great bargain preserved the formal unity of China
while practically respecting the current reality of a separate status
for Taiwan.

That arrangement has proven to be a blessing for Taiwan, while
simultaneously permitting the development of extensive U.S.-China
ties. Taiwan's resulting prosperity hardly needs documenting. It has
blossomed both as an economic miracle and as a democracy in the more
secure setting of abated Sino-American tensions, of continued U.S.
arms sales, and of the openly proclaimed U.S. stake in a peaceful
Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's success has also provided stunning and
encouraging evidence for the proposition that democracy and Chinese
culture are compatible, an example that has significant long-term
implications for the future evolution of mainland China.

Taiwan has not only prospered economically and flowered politically
but has become a respected and active participant in various
international organizations. For example, it is a full member of the
Asian Development Bank, APEC and the Central American Bank for
Economic Integration, and is currently seeking access to the WTO. It
maintains regular economic, technological and cultural ties with more
than 140 states with which it does not have formal diplomatic
relations.

An even more impressive testimonial to the benefits accruing from the
U.S.-China normalization of relations has been the actual
pacification of the Taiwan Strait. In contrast to the sporadic
clashes that used to occur prior to normalization, there has been a
massive flow of capital and people across the hitherto separating
water. These socioeconomic ties, in turn, have permitted the
emergence of an informal but serious dialogue between representatives
of the respective authorities.

Lee's Unilateralism

That informal accommodation was jeopardized in the second half of
1999 by the unilateral redefinition of Taiwan's relationship to the
mainland, abruptly launched by the Taiwanese authorities. In a highly
publicized interview, President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan suddenly
abandoned the "One China" formula, redefining the Taiwan-mainland
relationship as involving "state-to-state relations." The import of
the new formulation was self-evident: one China was brusquely
redefined as two separate states. Moreover, Lee in a subsequent
statement insisted that the inhabitants of Taiwan have acquired a
"fresh national identity based on the New Taiwanese consciousness."

Lee's initiative was launched without any prior consultations with
the United States. It was immediately followed, however, by
stepped-up efforts by Taiwanese supporters in the United States,
encouraged by a well-financed Taiwan lobby, to induce the U.S.
government, through congressional pressure, to take a stand in
support of Taiwanese "sovereignty." Various supporters of Taiwan also
launched a public campaign alleging a growing Chinese military threat
to Taiwan, urging particularly the Republican presidential candidates
to support the so-called "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act",
introduced earlier in the year in the U.S. Congress. That proposed
act aimed at nothing less than the de facto revival of the 1955
Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (terminated
following the U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China),
with its specific and non-discretionary provisions designed to
restore Taiwan as a U.S. military ally against China.

It should be noted that these alarmist pressure tactics disregarded
the fact that the PRC currently lacks, and in the foreseeable future
will not have, the airlift and sealift capability to effect a
successful 120-mile, cross-strait amphibious invasion. One need only
recall the enormous difficulty of the Normandy landings in 1944
across the narrower English channel, in spite of overwhelming allied
air and naval supremacy as well as the relative weakness of the
German forces. In contrast, the Taiwanese ground forces that would be
resisting any landing communist forces are relatively better armed
and more mobile. Taiwan also has the means to contest PRC efforts to
assert air and naval superiority in the Taiwan Strait.

It is also noteworthy that the U.S. secretary of defense, in an
assessment issued in February 1999, concluded that only "by 2005, the
PLA [People's Liberation Army] will possess the capability to attack
Taiwan with air and missile strikes which would degrade key military
facilities and damage the island's economic infrastructure." Even
then, the acquisition of such a capability would not mean that the
PRC could execute an effective invasion. One must also take into
account Taiwan's capacity to retaliate effectively by striking or
mining China's major ports, thereby cutting China's trade links with
the entire world.

In any case, whatever may have been Mr. Lee's motives in publicly
venting the formula of "state-to-state relations", there was no
pressing security need for his unilateral initiative. Hence the
question: cui bono? Since the Taiwanese leadership had to know that
it would complicate U.S.-China relations and generate new tensions in
the Taiwan Strait, one has to assume that the initiative was taken
(at least in part) on the calculation that any U.S.-China military
confrontation, even if provoked by Taiwan, would work to Taiwan's
political advantage.

For the United States, acquiescence to the new formulation and
passage of the proposed "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act" would mean
that Taiwan has been granted nothing short of a carte blanche to
redefine its status as it wishes, with the United States obligated to
defend the island, come what may. It would amount to a de facto
unconditional guarantee of U.S. protection for whatever provocative
step Taiwan might take, including even a formal secession from China,
and thus it would be a repudiation of prior U.S.-China undertakings.
It is also important to note that in any ensuing hostilities in the
Taiwan Strait, the United States would find itself altogether
isolated internationally.

For China, the proposed U.S. legislation would signal America's
re-engagement in the Chinese civil war, while Beijing's acquiescence
to the new "state-to-state" formulation would mean the formal
acceptance of the permanent partition of China. Neither is a
palatable choice for Beijing. It would also mean that, in the eyes of
the Chinese, the grand bargain with the United States had been
exploited by Washington, first to consolidate Taiwan, and then to
transform a separatist Taiwan into a permanent U.S. protectorate. No
current Chinese leader could accept such an outcome and normal
relations between the United States and the PRC would thereby be
jeopardized.

The Clinton administration was, therefore, fully justified in repudiating the new Taiwanese formula and in reassuring Beijing that previous U.S.-China understandings remained in force. For some time to come, Washington will have no choice but to navigate carefully between the risk inherent in any unconditional assurances to Taiwan's security and the obligation to discourage any Chinese attempt at coercive unification. Perhaps an additional bilateral Washington-Beijing clarification regarding Taiwan might be helpful if it were to involve a clear-cut Chinese commitment (expressed, naturally, as a unilateral Chinese decision) never to use force in order to achieve national unity, matched by a simultaneous--and similarly "independent"--U. S. commitment to terminate all arms sales to Taiwan if it should formally declare itself to have seceded from China. However, even then, the U.S.-China relationship would still remain vulnerable to disruption because of the unresolved and always sensitive issue of Taiwan's future. That is why it is unlikely that either side would be willing to exchange such mutual assurances.

Democracy: The Essential Condition

ULTIMATELY, the issue of Taiwan will be determined primarily by what happens in China itself. A China that fails to evolve politically, or that flounders socially--not to speak of a China that regresses ideologically--will not attract Taiwan. Nor will it intimidate Taiwan, for the United States will continue to have a tangible national interest in the prevention of warfare in the Taiwan Strait. It follows that Taiwan will, and should, continue to have prudently measured access to the necessary U.S. military wherewithal for self-defense.

Essay Types: Essay