What We Should Do

The fact that North Korea is competing in a race that it simply cannot win now seems evident even to Pyongyang.  North Korean officials know that they are losing and therefore want to change the game.  And the United States should help them.  A suitable first step for Washington would be to eliminate restrictions on personal travel to, and non-strategic trade with, North Korea.  There are no better ambassadors for the United States than private individuals engaged in academic, cultural, and economic exchange.  It is not clear that the DPRK has a lot to offer economically, other than the "disciplined" work force described in a new brochure encouraging investment, but simply talking would be useful.

Second, Washington should build on the recent diplomatic meetings (sixteen so far) held in Beijing by encouraging additional discussions between American and North Korean diplomats.  As part of this process, we should press for "cross-recognition" between the two Koreas and the major powers.  Pyongyang has long resisted this step, but then it also long refused to consider dual entry to the UN.  Indeed, we seem to be moving toward a de facto cross-recognition, with the USSR and perhaps Japan recognizing both Koreas.  America and China could offer to complete the process by recognizing the North and South, respectively, a step Pyongyang might find difficult to resist, just as it has yielded to reality on UN membership.

Third, the United States needs to move arms control to the forefront in East Asia.  Particularly important is the question of nuclear weapons.  The DPRK appears to be developing an atomic capability and has yet to formally agree on international inspection of its facilities.  The possibility of a nuclear-armed North disquiets all of its neighbors, which means the United States can cooperate with both China and the Soviet Union to discourage Pyongyang from acquiring atomic weapons.

Friendly persuasion, however, may not be enough.  The USSR has lost much of its leverage on the North and Pyongyang has undoubtedly undertaken its nuclear research program at least in part because of the assumed presence of American tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea.  These weapons are also a source of political discontent in the South, since the United States claims the right to decide whether to use them on Korean soil.  America should withdraw the weapons and challenge the North to respond by opening up its facilities to international inspection.  Of course, the DPRK might find some pretext to back away from its proposal for a nuclear-free peninsula, but the only way to find out is to put it to the test.

South Korean and American officials have so far resisted proposals to pull out the tactical nuclear weapons, and Secretary of State Baker has said that Washington will not link the two issues.  But Pyongyang's fears about the nuclear imbalance are not wholly unreasonable, and the issue may soon become critical.  Although by most estimates a North Korean nuclear weapon seems at least three to five years away, if Pyongyang moves ahead, it will leave the United States and the ROK with three equally unpalatable choices: a permanent Washington nuclear guarantee for Seoul and probably Tokyo; the creation of a South Korean and possibly a Japanese bomb; or a preemptive strike, something recently suggested by South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-ku.  As none of these is attractive, North Korea's apparent receptivity to a peaceful solution should be probed.

The changing balance between the two Koreas also provides an opportunity for conventional arms reduction.  Washington and South Korea should jointly develop a plan to phase out American forces.  The South should then announce its willingness to see the U.S. troops leave and suggest that North Korea respond by pulling its troops back from their advanced positions along the DMZ, demobilizing some armored and infantry units, and entering into serious arms reduction talks.  (Dr. Cha Young-koo of the South Korean Institute for Defense Analyses recently proposed a "Limited Deployment Zone" to reduce the number of troops adjacent to the border.)  Given its economic crisis, the North may finally be serious about the radical disarmament plans that it has advanced for years.  Successful negotiations would lead to an acceleration of the American withdrawal and forestall a major South Korean arms build-up; failure would slow the American pull-out and force the South to expand its military.

Some analysts want to maintain U.S. forces in the peninsula irrespective of the shifting balance between the two Koreas, in order to preserve an American presence in the region.  Yet 43,000 soldiers in South Korea serve little value.  War with the USSR is unlikely at best and the forces stationed in Korea threaten no vital Soviet interests, nor are the bases necessary for the Navy to operate in a war in Northeast Asia.  In any serious and widespread conflict such an advanced outpost might be hard to maintain and might constitute a strategic embarrassment.

However, assistant secretary for East Asia and Pacific affairs, Richard Solomon, thinks the Soviet threat is irrelevant.  He recently told Congress that "were the Soviet presence to disappear in the emerging security environment, our role as regional balancer and honest broker would, if anything, be more important than ever."  But why?

China, which spends less than South Korea on the military and which is engrossed with internal problems, is even less likely to be an aggressor.  A few analysts view Japan and the United States as being on a long-term collision course and believe an American presence must be preserved to contain our supposed ally.  (For instance, retired Army Chief of Staff General E.C. Meyer considers a reunited Germany and a potentially rearmed Japan to be the two largest threats after the demise of aggressive Soviet communism).  Others have a more benign view of Japanese intentions but worry that an American pull-out might spur Japanese rearmament, thereby unsettling the region.

The threat of Japanese aggression seems faint.  The Kaifu government's proposal to send 2,000 non-combatants to the Gulf collapsed amid widespread popular opposition and the government recently unveiled a five-year defense program that slows the growth of military outlays and cuts the number of ground troops by one-sixth.  More fundamentally, it is difficult to imagine what might impel a nation that has acquired as much wealth and influence peacefully in recent years to go to war again.  If such aggression is really a possibility, it is in America's interest to spur the Pacific and East Asian nations, including South Korea, to increase defense cooperation in order to deter any attack.

More reasonable is the charge that Japan's rearmament would disturb its neighbors.  Relations between Tokyo and those neighbors remain tainted by World War II; one Chinese analyst complains that "the prospect of Japanese remilitarization is a nightmare to all Asian peoples, and particularly to us."  But Tokyo is cognizant of the problem--in May Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu toured several ASEAN countries and made perhaps the strongest apology yet for Japan's actions in World War II.  He also reiterated past promises that Japan would not become a military power, describing its "appropriate role in the political sphere as a nation of peace," promoting conflict resolution.

This foray into the international arena was generally well received.  Japanese ships also stopped at the Philippines on their way to mine-sweeping duties in the Gulf, Japan's first naval mission beyond its territorial waters in forty-six years, and ASEAN officials were unconcerned.  As Tommy Koh, Singapore's former ambassador to Washington, saw it, "What Kaifu is trying to do is very gently take Japan over the threshold into playing a wider role."  South Korea's decision to hold regular policy talks with the United States and Japan about East Asian policy suggests the possibility of expanded regional cooperation in the future.

Equally important, the end of the Cold War, supplemented by the recent drawdown of Soviet forces in the region--including the departure of all air and naval units from Cam Ranh Bay, the elimination of fifty older vessels in their Pacific fleet, the reduction of forces on the disputed Kurile islands, and the demobilization of some 200,000 service personnel--and by China's turn inward, means that Japan can remain secure even without launching a large military build-up in the wake of an American pull-back.  The current defense relationship, where the United States essentially borrows money from Japan to defend Japan, is outdated.  But the response to an American withdrawal need not be a significantly more powerful Japan, since the threats facing Japan are dissipating.  Instead, Japan could modestly augment its forces, particularly with defensive weapons such as interceptors and frigates, and offer to aid countries, including the ROK, with grants and loans to allow them to enhance their defensive capabilities.

The Korean peninsula is still one of the world's enduring hot spots, but it need not remain so.  To be sure, North Korea is not ready for democratic capitalism: earlier this year Kim Jong-il told the North Korean Communist Party Central Committee that "though the imperialists and reactionaries are now viciously trying to stifle socialism, our socialism continues advancing vigorously along its road without the slightest vacillation in the face of their despicable attack and slander."  But reality has apparently begun to sink into Pyongyang.  While the positive signs being emitted by North Korea are faint, they are positive nonetheless.  The United States should therefore take advantage of this important opportunity to help reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula.

Essay Types: Essay