First, a mood of apathy prevails in the Arabic-speaking countries.  It has been many years since their populations have been willing to give up their lives for abstract causes; they take matters into their own hands only when an issue is of direct personal concern.  Arabs are so prone to riot against currency adjustments, subsidy cuts, and other austerity reforms--as shown by disturbances in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, the Sudan, and Jordan--that they have earned a reputation at the International Monetary Fund for an unwillingness to tolerate the most modest economic adjustments.  But symbolic causes are another matter.  By now, Arabs are a much-disappointed people, stuck in what Hisham Sharabi terms a condition of "paralyzing trauma."

Second, today's regimes have immense coercive power despite their inner crises of legitimacy.  While Iraq has the most notoriously repressive apparatus of any state in the Middle East, comparable institutions exist in nearly all Arabic-speaking countries.  Even such apparently fragile governments as those of Saudi Arabia and Jordan engage in what Michael C. Hudson has dubbed "monarchy by mukhabarat [security apparatus]."  Their power permits considerable leeway in pursuing unpopular policies.

Finally, there is a deep respect for the winner, indicated in a revealing Arab proverb: "Kiss the hand you cannot bite."  Today, that is the American hand.  Far from being enraged at Washington's victory over Iraq, Arabs will respect it for doing what it threatened--at least for a while.  The record also suggests that this respect will dissipate.  That might happen slowly (the West Bank under Israeli rule remained essentially quiescent for twenty years) or quickly (the Israelis received a hero's welcome in southern Lebanon in 1982 and despairingly fled the area just three years later).

Assuming allied forces prevail, the U.S. government can count on a period of months, but not much more, to stabilize the Persian Gulf.  Washington must seize its moment of great but transient influence; it should not squander this opportunity by haring off to another issue.  The point bears making, for Western analysts widely agree that the postwar period provides the ideal setting to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Henry Kissinger sees victory in the Gulf as "a historic opportunity" to deal with this issue; the usually sensible Economist goes so far as to argue that "America's main job in the post-war Middle East will be to act as honest broker between Israel and the Palestinians."  Douglas Hurd, the British foreign secretary, has promised a return to the Palestinian issue "with renewed vigor" once the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait is over; the French government is even more eager for linkage.  Saudi and Egyptian authorities see the Palestinian cause as the ideal vehicle to burnish their national credentials; and, if past patterns hold, the U.S. government will not resist Saudi pressure.(2)  Indeed, as early as October 1990, President Bush signaled some willingness to link the two issues.

But this would be a terrible error.  A precipitous turn of attention from Iraq and Kuwait to the Arab-Israeli conflict would forfeit a rare chance to overhaul the politics of a key region.  It would be like neglecting Germany and Japan in late 1945 to solve the Irish problem.  Actually, something like this happened in 1982, when Washington's inability to keep its eyes off the West Bank led to the loss of a unique chance in Lebanon.  Here is the story:

Israeli forces had attained their goals in Lebanon by the end of August 1982--getting the PLO out of that country, reducing Syrian military strength, having a friendly government installed.  Although these were Israeli achievements, not American ones, Israel's close association with the United States, including its reliance on American weapons, caused U.S. prestige to soar in tandem with Israel's.  Washington could have seized that moment to restructure the Lebanese polity by changing the communal balance of the government, carefully reducing the Christians' power in favor of the Muslims.(3)

Instead, Washington pushed Lebanese issues to the side.  Noting that the Lebanon War "has left us with a new opportunity," President Reagan on September 1, 1982 offered a plan to resolve the West Bank conundrum, suggesting Palestinian association with Jordan.  King Hussein of Jordan mulled the idea for seven months, then decided against it in April 1983.  Rebuffed, Secretary of State George Shultz returned his attention to Lebanon, but by then American diplomacy no longer could prevail.  The Syrian military was again strong and a new Lebanese president had taken office.  Unconcerned, Shultz used his office to prod the Lebanese and Israelis into ending the state of war between their two countries.  His victory, however, was Pyrrhic: less than a year after the May 17, 1983 agreement was signed, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad had forced the Lebanese government to renounce it.  Washington had missed a fleeting chance to make a difference in Lebanon.

Eight years later, this unhappy episode has sunk down the memory hole.  The Bush administration appears ready to travel the same path--skipping from Iraq, the problem of the moment, to the Israeli-Palestinian morass.  Yet, it plainly makes no sense to ignore Iraq just as a very costly investment is about to pay off.  Moreover, shunting aside the relatively simple problem in the Persian Gulf in favor of the notorious difficulties a thousand miles to the west is illogical.  But then, as Irving Kristol has observed, "Whom the gods would destroy they first tempt to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict."

Clearly, the U.S. government should concentrate on the Persian Gulf.  Planners should consider these specific steps in pursuing American interests:

--Explicitly affirm the territorial integrity of Iraq within its present borders and impress this commitment on potential aggressors (Syria, Turkey, Iran).

--Announce that the U.S. government is willing to deal with Saddam.  This gives the Iraqi leader an incentive to end the fighting; it also gives Washington the latitude to cut a deal with him.  Such a step is obviously distasteful, but it promotes American interests.

--Announce that the U.S. government does not intend to bring down Saddam Hussein.  While it is emphatically not true, as John Waterbury claims, that Saddam's destruction would be "the worst possible outcome" (his victory would be the worst outcome), to reject any dealing with the Iraqi tyrant would be an emotional indulgence.  Conversely, letting him stay in power helps reduce the possibility that American troops need occupy Iraq.

--Announce a willingness to deal with the Ba'ath Party.  Having liquidated alternative leaderships (with the single exception of the Kurds, who cannot rule Iraq), the Ba'athists cannot readily be replaced.  Ousting them probably implies an occupation of Iraq by American and allied forces--or, in their absence, by the Iranians.

--Leave as much of the country's basic infrastructure standing as is compatible with swift victory.  The worse the destruction, the greater the power vacuum which an outside force--great powers or neighbors--will fill.

--Insist that the Iraqi government reduce its armed forces to about 200,000 soldiers, enough to defend the country from its neighbors but not to act aggressively.

--To assure this diminution of Iraqi power, reach an agreement with allies about maintaining a military embargo after the war.  Because the allies might default on their promises, keep the open option of further military action.

--Plan for a speedy reduction of American and other non-Muslim troops from the Persian Gulf.  No more than 50,000 or so infidels should remain in the region.

--To deter future Iraqi or Iranian aggression, initiate discussions with Muslim leaders about their forming a multinational force in the Gulf.

Some of these steps are counterintuitive and others are painful or difficult to achieve.  But all are necessary if Americans are to emerge from the Kuwait Crisis with gains commensurate with their sacrifices.

 

Daniel Pipes, director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, taught strategy at the U.S. Naval War College.

 

1. Nor had anyone else from the administration filled the lacuna by the time of this writing (late February).

2. Two regimes, those of Saudi Arabia and China, enjoy a uniquely privileged place in American foreign policy.  Although both have repeatedly proved themselves unfriendly to U.S. interests and values, Washington illogically feels indebted to them.  In the present crisis, this imbalance means official U.S. gratitude to the Saudis for allowing American troops on their territory to crush Saddam--rather than expecting gratitude for having saved Saudi Arabia from mortal danger.  This in turn may lead Washington to put the squeeze on Israel.

3.  This is what the Syrians eventually pulled off in the Ta'if Accord of 1988.  Back in late 1982, when I was working on the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, I proposed such a plan to the U.S. government.  So thoroughly was this idea rebuffed that I readily received permission to publish my idea as an article.  (It appeared in the Summer 1983 issue of Foreign Policy.)

Essay Types: Essay