The Real Reason the U.S. Navy Misses the F-14 Tomcat
The F-14 Tomcat, which was operational from the early 1970s, offered a substantial range of approximately 1,600 miles, greatly surpassing that of the Super Hornets. The long-range and high-speed capabilities of the Tomcat would have been particularly valuable today as the Navy addresses threats within China’s growing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy.
Summary: The U.S. Navy's fleet of strike aircraft, including the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, faces a significant capability gap in terms of operational range, especially in comparison to retired aircraft like the A-6 bombers and F-14 Tomcat fighters. The Super Hornets can cover about 400 to 500 miles, which may be insufficient given the evolving reach of Beijing’s anti-ship ballistic missiles.
-The F-14 Tomcat, which was operational from the early 1970s, offered a substantial range of approximately 1,600 miles, greatly surpassing that of the Super Hornets. The long-range and high-speed capabilities of the Tomcat would have been particularly valuable today as the Navy addresses threats within China’s growing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy.
-The absence of such long-range aircraft could impact the Navy's ability to effectively manage these emerging threats.
U.S. Navy's Range Dilemma: How Retired F-14 Tomcat Outpaces Current Fleet
The U.S. Navy’s fleet of strike aircraft lacks a key capability: range. The Navy’s Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets can fly roughly 400 miles with a nearly full weapons load. That range can stretch to about 500 miles via a buddy pod alongside another F-18 fighter. As Beijing’s anti-ship ballistic missiles continue to evolve, this limited range could be a problem.
The Navy used to rely on fleets of A-6 bombers and F-14 Tomcat fighters, both of which could fly to much longer ranges than their successors. The Super Hornet may be a more capable aircraft in many regards, but the service’s rediscovered need for longer-range strike abilities probably has it missing the Tomcat.
Introducing the F-14 Tomcat
The F-14 Tomcat was conceptualized in the late 1950s. The Navy sought a long-range, high-endurance interceptor capable of protecting its carrier battle groups. Under the direction of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the Navy joined the Air Force in the joint Tactical Fighter Experimental program, or TFX. While the airframe resulting from TFX could operate as both a fighter-bomber and an interceptor, it lacked adequate range, speed, and payload.
Manufacturer Northrop Grumman was ultimately awarded the contract to produce its F-14 prototype, a twin-engine, air-to-air fighter that could reach a top speed of Mach 2.2.
The first Tomcat took its maiden flight in 1970, and the fighter reached initial operational capability three years later. The fighter was equipped with AIM-54B and later AIM-54C air-to-air missiles, and it could carry up to half a dozen Phoenix missiles. Additionally, the Tomcat was armed with a General Electric Vulcan M61A 120 mm gun with 675 rounds of ammunition. The F-14 boasted advanced sensors and countermeasures, and each Tomcat was fitted with the AN/ALQ-126 jammer. The Raytheon AN/APG-71 digital multimode radar was also incorporated in the platform, providing non-cooperative target identification among other capabilities.
Why the Navy Misses the Tomcat’s Range
Perhaps the Tomcat’s most revered capability was its long range of approximately 1,600 miles. Two Pratt & Whitney engines providing more than 20,000 pounds of static thrust powered the platform. This energy allowed the fighter to engage hostile targets from as far as 90 miles away.
If the Tomcat were still in service today, it would be a huge asset as the Navy contends with the growing threat of China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. While the concept of an upgraded Super Tomcat was considered at one time, the service ultimately decided to dedicate all of its efforts to the Hornet, and later to the F-35C.
Without the F-14 Tomcat’s range and its prowess to direct against A2/AD threats, the Navy will have to rely on other means and new platforms to fill this defensive role.
About the Author: Maya Carlin
Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.
