Military Deception (MILDEC) is the art of misleading an adversary into believing incorrect information in order to elicit a desired response-. To do this, MILDEC planners need to craft a believable and thoroughly layered deception story that leaves a series of breadcrumbs for the adversary to follow to the intended conclusion. These breadcrumbs, or “conduits to the target” in MILDEC doctrine, are determined by planning backward and answering the following questions – what do we want the enemy to do? This determines “what do we want the enemy to think?” which then determines “what do we want the enemy to see?”
In “The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh,” audiences saw the honey-obsessed protagonist develop a scheme to procure honey directly from the source - a beehive high on a tree branch. Despite being a bear of very little brain, Pooh recognizes that were he to climb the tree, the bees would see the approaching threat to their hive, and act accordingly to defend the honey supply.Because this process is, at its core, an exercise in infiltrating adversary decision making, Military Deception is an art requiring a certain deftness and subtle touch. It requires layers and multiple backstops to make the conduits seem believable, rather than obvious displays intended for enemy consumption; one cannot merely claim something overtly and expect the adversary to accept it prima facie . So, where can one look for lessons on the sufficient layers to invade an adversary’s cognitive space and lead him or her to the desired conclusion?
Our hero decides to come up with a ruse to mask his approach. He covers himself in black mud, ties himself to a balloon, and floats towards the hive, all while singing a song, "I'm just a little black rain cloud."
This part of the deception seems fairly straightforward; Pooh presents indicators (conduits) of the conclusion he wishes the bees to draw and places those indicators directly where he knows they will be collected by the bees' sensors (eyes/ ears). Much of Military Deception is planned along these lines: present conduits that would lead an adversary to draw a conclusion and wait for their analysis to lead them to that natural conclusion.
This, however, was not the only component of Pooh’s deception plan. Rather, it’s the concurrent effort where we can draw a lesson from this example. At the same time, Pooh is floating towards the tree. A simultaneous and more clever plan is in motion. Christopher Robin, Pooh’s human best friend, is walking back and forth under the purported “rain cloud,” holding an umbrella, and repeating “tut tut, it looks like rain.”
Now, while this is easy to dismiss as silly action in a children's story, it is, in fact, an example of master-level deception.
Specifically, Christopher Robin represents a third, ostensibly disinterested party who has seen the same, or similar, conduits as the bees have (black object, dripping moisture, singing a song claiming to be a rain cloud), and drawn exactly the conclusion Pooh wishes the bees to draw as part of his deception story. This reinforces their confirmation bias or predisposition to draw conclusions from the conduits.
Why is this so masterful? Because MILDEC is an exercise in the human domain, and the key adversary decision makers are human and susceptible to human impulses. The study of cognitive biases has demonstrated through multiple examples (bystander bias, availability bias, etc.) that it is common in human nature to feel more comfortable when joining in the collective conclusion of a group. In this case, the more confirmations of the adversary’s own analysis that are present, the more confident the adversary can feel in its validity. This is what the MILDEC planner strives for: The more comfortable the adversary is with the analysis, the more likely he or she is to take the desired action.
Some of the most successful and famous MILDEC operations, such as Operation BODYGUARD (the Allied effort to convince Germany of a D-Day landing at Pas-de-Calais), dropped numerous conduits in front of many sensors and collection mechanisms for the Axis powers to receive. But at the end of the day, this still relied on feeding raw and unrefined information to Nazi intelligence for their analysis. What Christopher Robin represents is a separate entity who has done his own independent collection, analyzed the indicators, and taken appropriate steps in reaction (deployed an umbrella) all within the field of view of the bees, confirming their own analytical process. Traditional conduits provide the adversary with more pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. A “Christopher Robin” holds up the picture of the solved puzzle on the front of the box for the adversary to see.
In finding a “Christopher Robin,” MILDEC planners face a decision. In the scenario described, Christopher Robin was a witting participant in the scheme and merely independent by appearance. It is possible that other witting Christopher Robins could play a similar role for MILDEC plans, but one must be aware of how those witting players might be viewed. In other words, the U.K. confirming a conclusion the United States wishes Iran to act upon may not have the desired effect and, in some cases, could raise the suspicions of the targeted decision makers. Therefore, MILDEC planners may need to influence an unwitting Christopher Robin, which would require a separate, supporting deception story and set of conduits to lead them to the desired conclusion. By influencing these unwitting parties, this lays the groundwork for more trusted analysis on the part of the original target. These could be countries closely aligned or with traditional shared interests, or they could be international and multinational organizations who are perceived to be neutral.
MILDEC is not easy, and successfully planned MILDEC requires a finely tuned and choreographed set of inputs to successfully lead an adversary to follow the breadcrumbs left for them. Some of these are within the control of the country conducting the MILDEC – the Allies could parade General George Patton around his Ghost Army or send as many false reports as they desired through co-opted double agents. Some of this deception play will fall outside of the direct control of those planning it. However, to truly make the adversary feel that these indicators are legitimate, and not in fact what they are – elements of a deception scheme – the MILDEC practitioner should always be on the lookout for that third, seemingly disinterested party – that little boy under an umbrella who looks back at the target of the deception and says, “tut tut, it looks like rain.”
LTC Michael D. Nelson is an Army Special Forces Officer and veteran of Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and Inherent Resolve. His views do not represent the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense.
This article by Mike Nelson first appeared in Real Clear Defense on April 4, 2020.
Image: Reuters.