To do so the incoming Biden administration should reach out to Pyongyang and indicate its interest in opening a dialogue. The objective should be to make some smaller agreements for arms control that move along a path that could ultimately result in denuclearization. There is much that the North could trade away while preserving a nuclear deterrent. For instance, North Korea could cap nuclear and weapons production, halt the development of intercontinental missiles and forswear proliferation to governments and especially non-state actors. Some policymakers fear anything short of complete, irreversible, verifiable dismantlement, also known as CIVD, will effectively legitimize a nuclear North Korea. However, it is time to squarely face reality. The DPRK already is a nuclear state and Kim is not going to disarm in reliance on unenforceable promises of goodwill. Now would be a particularly bad time to sacrifice the good in search of the perfect.

Just as Americans were told that they had to go to war with the army they had, they have to negotiate with the adversary that they have. In the case of North Korea, that means Kim Jong-un. He appears to be no less resolute than his father and grandfather but may be more open to making a deal acceptable to America. To explore this possibility the incoming Biden administration should build on the flawed but vital opening almost single-handedly created by Trump.

Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is author of several books, including Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and co-author of The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea.

Image: Reuters.