China has never prioritized the denuclearization of North Korea, but its claim to put “stability” first is misleading. Its reasoning can be found in writings: on Korean history, including the Korean War; on the “crisis” on the peninsula over the past twenty years; and on South Korean foreign policy. China’s objective is to transform the peninsula in line with Sinocentric ambitions. This is encapsulated in three developments: 1) undermining the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance, first by insisting on a “balanced” ROK foreign policy and then on a “multilateral” security framework in place of the U.S. alliance; 2) preventing reunification on any conceivable terms, keeping North Korea isolated and exclusively dependent on China and ensuring that it continues to pressure South Korea, which reverberates in South Korean dependence on China; and 3) holding hostage Sino-U.S. cooperation on North Korea, playing the “North Korean card” through issue linkages to restrain U.S. responses at odds with China’s expansionist agenda across the Indo-Pacific.

Chinese publications do not spell out China’s ambitions, but they provide ample evidence of the Sinocentric reasoning behind policy choices. On Korean history, the narrative unambiguously shifts from a Sino-Japanese clash to a Sino-Western clash rooted in civilizations and geopolitics. Censoring some sprouts of honesty about the origin of the Korean War. Chinese link it to forces displacing Chinese civilization in favor of Western civilization in South Korea that pose greater barriers to revived Sinocentrism than exist in North Korea.  As for the “crisis” on the peninsula, Chinese writings in the early stages of the Six-Party Talks already indicated that official U.S. statements about five vs. one were way off the mark, considering what the Chinese required for any resolution. In 2008-2010 the response to the breakdown in these talks and to North Korean provocations offered clear proof of Sinocentrism prevailing over multilateralism. The “wolf warrior” tone of Chinese writings on South Korea came into the open in 2016 over the THAAD decision, and, ever since, warnings have ranged widely regarding what further transgressions (essentially against Sinocentism, such as in security ties to Japan or endorsement of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”) would invite more unofficial sanctions beyond those imposed due to THAAD and partially retracted after Moon Jae-in in late 2017 capitulated with the “three noes.” Behind demands on Seoul far tougher than those on Tokyo is the historical understanding that Korea is the first line of Sinocentrism.  

The Chinese watchwords or “tifa” found in writings on the Korean Peninsula need to be parsed for what they really mean rather than interpreted as if they have the meaning many uncritically attribute to them. Sinocentric connotations are often overlooked by those narrowly focused on geopolitical maneuvering or inattentive to a range of Chinese writings (earlier neibu sources for internal circulation were more forthright in conveying intentions, but gongkai sources available to all are pretty clear these days). China claims to be opposed to “hegemony,” to pursue only “balanced” relations between it and the U.S., and to support “multilateralism” but not the “fake multilateralism” the U.S. is pressing South Korea to embrace. Behind these facades, one finds demands that fail to respect the balance that would safeguard South Korean security and the networks that broaden security ties beyond the United States. Foremost in China’s approach is keeping South Korea alienated from Japan—on history as well as security. Telling about China’s logic is the response of writers to Moon’s diplomacy in 2018-2019 with Kim Jong-un, disparaging the bypassing of China while separately advancing an alternative path forward to Kim shrouded in mystery. Finally, there have been recent hints of linkage between Taiwan and North Korea, implying that as Beijing applies more pressure on Taiwan and the U.S. counters with more support, Beijing will do more to support Pyongyang as it further reveals its Korean agenda.

Gilbert Rozman is the Emeritus Musgrave Professor of Sociology and the editor-in-chief of The Asan Forum, a bi-monthly, online journal on international relations in the Indo-Pacific region. 

Image: Reuters