North Korea has been unequivocal about its intentions concerning its nuclear weapons. In September 2022, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) promulgated a Law on DPRK's Policy on Nuclear Forces, stating that nuclear weapons would remain a permanent fixture in the country's defense. A few days before the law's enactment, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared that North Korea would never relinquish its nuclear weapons and that his country would no longer engage in denuclearization talks with foreign powers. None of this has changed since North Korea is expanding its arms trade with Russia. Consequently, North Korean leaders have no intention of giving up nuclear weapons. With North Korea’s belief in the necessity of a credible nuclear deterrent as firm as ever, the window of opportunity for a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula has closed.

This does not imply that the international community recognizes North Korea’s right to possess nuclear weapons. Most countries are committed to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, which grants such a right only to the current permanent members of the UN Security Council. Therefore, North Korea will not achieve the status of a legitimate nuclear power.

Yet, if giving up nuclear weapons is not realistic for North Korea, what happens next? Engaging in a war against a country with nuclear weapons and delivery systems does not appear rational, whether or not North Korea is a legitimate or illegitimate nuclear power. Thus, the international community must decide on a course of action rather than halting all dialogue until North Korea is willing to abandon its nuclear weapons, which currently seems highly unlikely.

Looking at the evolving situation, it becomes evident that there is a more pressing agenda than whether North Korea should relinquish its nuclear weapons. The primary concern today is not the existence of the few nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles in North Korea’s possession but the development of tactical weapons and North Korea’s emerging ability to wage nuclear warfare. This presents a classical theoretical dilemma regarding the “perfectness” of rationality in extended deterrence situations, as developed by Reinhard Selten in the 1970s. 

In the broader context, North Korea lacks a rational reason to instigate a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula, as its losses would certainly outweigh American losses. However, decisions in the nuclear game are made one move at a time, and one can imagine the choices the United States might face after a tactical nuclear strike by North Korea on South Korea. Would it be realistic to assume that the United States would opt to sacrifice one or several of its cities in a fight against North Korea to defend South Korea? Such a move would not be rational, and unless all the actions in a comprehensive strategy are rational, the overall strategy cannot be credible, as Selten theorizes. 

Practically, this means that unless South Korea and the United States can negotiate an arms control agreement to prevent North Korea from acquiring the ability to wage a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula and win it, North Korean leaders may be misguided to believe that Selten's assessment of the lacking credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence strategy is accurate. The current priority is to find ways that offer security for both Koreas under the existing circumstances, with North Korea possessing nuclear weapons but not a nuclear warfighting capacity. One should no longer focus on the efforts of the past to prevent North Korea from getting nuclear weapons. Those efforts have already failed.

Timo Kivimäki is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Bath.

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