Instability in the Balkans added to the conflictual dynamic, particularly in Serbia, which had become a destabilizing factor since the 1903 coup in the country. The coup brought a pro-Russian king, Peter Karageorgevich, to power. Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (administered by Vienna since 1878) in 1908 was a response to the coup in order to solidify a buffer region against Serbian nationalism and Russian expansionism. The move, however, was seen as humiliating for the Russians, who saw themselves as guardians of all Slavs. The annexation also further inflamed Serbia’s nationalists, and the Black Hand, a secret organization that wanted to use subversion and terrorist tactics to create a greater Serbia, was formed in 1911.

Moreover, the British also could no longer play the role of an offshore balancer in 1914. By then, the meticulously constructed configuration of power in Europe had been disrupted with Germany’s unification in 1871. Germany had become too powerful, while the British were overstretched. When the July crisis erupted in the Balkans, Britain fruitlessly offered to play the role of a mediator many times to no avail.

The shift in ideological beliefs among Europeans was another factor that exacerbated the conflictual dynamic in Eastern Europe. In the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions, European governments, whether liberal-leaning or conservative, had become sensitive to public opinion, which made backing down or restraining allies difficult during crises. The Germans gave a so-called blank check to the Austria-Hungarians instead of restraining them, while the French had given their own blank check to the Russians, for example.

Furthermore, the ideology of social Darwinism had replaced the norms of balance of power by the late nineteenth century. As historian and scholar of World War I Annika Mombauer notes, prevailing was “the belief that nations and peoples are subject to the same biological laws as animals and that they are going to either rise to the top or they are going to be eliminated in a vying for power,” and that a great power has to “eventually fight a war against other powers and, obviously, win that war.”

Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

As a distant maritime power, the United States is in a unique position to influence conflicts over strategic buffer regions. First and most important of all, the United States should seek to maintain the balance of power among competing regional powers, as imbalance of power is a major catalyst of conflicts over strategic buffer zones. Second, the United States should seek to stabilize fragmented strategic buffer zones or avoid creating them in the first place since a buffer conflict is difficult to manage when there are too many local actors with competing interests and shifting loyalties. Third, the United States should become a credible third-party mediator among competing regional powers by maintaining the most powerful military capable of projecting power and by being a “fair” mediator. Last but not least, the United States should work with other great powers to agree on a set of common principles to maintain global stability and order, as the Congress of Vienna had done before. With a foreign policy based on these principles, the United States can continue to maintain its standing in the world in a sustainable manner to secure its political, economic, and security interests.

Sungtae “Jacky” Park is an international security analyst based in Washington DC. This piece is a preview of the paper, Securing Strategic Buffer Space: Case Studies and Implications for U.S. Global Strategy.

Image: U.S. Air Force