"The proclaimed actions taken by North Korea are unacceptable," said President George W. Bush in the aftermath of the North's apparent nuclear test. But the president and his aides have been saying much the same thing for five years. There is a big difference between Washington viewing the act as unacceptable and making it unacceptable. In particular, what thinks Beijing?

After all, in the opinion of the Bush Administration, almost everything done by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea over the last five years has been unacceptable. But no matter: Pyongyang forged ahead with its nuclear plans. Now, it seems, North Korea has officially joined the eight other nuclear weapons states.

For all the furor generated by North Korea's announcement, nothing has really changed. It has long been assumed that the DPRK possessed enough plutonium to make as many as a dozen bombs and was weapons-capable. Many steps likely remain before Pyongyang actually creates a deliverable weapon. In any deal, the North's substantial nuclear infrastructure would have to be dismantled, whether or not Kim Jong-il's regime had conducted a test. With his latest gambit, Kim merely has confirmed everyone's suspicions.

Still, disarming North Korea today seems an even more daunting task than persuading Pyongyong not to trek down the nuclear road. The increasingly vivid vision of a potential weapon is likely to whet Kim's appetite for more. Every fearful complaint and unrealized threat voiced abroad merely encourage Kim to move ahead. For he and his nation are important internationally only because of the nuclear weapons program. And only a nuclear arsenal can truly ensure against an attempt at regime change by the Republic of Korea, United States, or, less plausibly, Japan, or even China.

In fact, unless the Bush Administration is prepared to trigger the Second Korean War, Washington can do little: the only justification for a military strike would be an imminent military threat, but none exists.  Moreover, there are no diplomatic relations to break, no economic ties to sever.

There's only pushing for "an immediate response by the United Nations Security Council," in the president's words. America's UN ambassador, John Bolton, has called for "a strong response," not just "a piece of paper." Washington has proposed banning luxury and military trade, inspecting North Korean cargoes, and freezing assets connected to weapons sales. But these steps will be possible only with the acquiescence of the People's Republic of China and Russia. The latter has little at stake, other than stored resentment over recent U.S. policy. However, even Moscow might be reluctant to sanction a de facto blockade, technically an act of war.

The PRC has long stood in the breach for North Korea. Although no longer as close to the DPRK as during the Cold War, Beijing supplies North Korea with food and oil. China advocated bilateral discussions between Washington and the North. Beijing steered previous Security Council meetings away from sanctions, softened the Security Council resolution adopted after the July missile tests, criticized Australia and Japan for imposing their own economic restrictions last month, and weakened the statement issued by the Security Council last week to dissuade the North from initiating a test.

Still, China's patience does not appear to be inexhaustible. The PRC long has been dissatisfied with its client's behavior. China has pushed Pyongyang to attend the six-party talks and criticized North Korean belligerence. At Washington's request Beijing recently sanctioned a North Korean bank in Macao for apparent money laundering.  In July Beijing publicly warned the North against its multiple missile tests.

Last week China's UN ambassador stated that no one would "protect" Pyongyang "for bad behavior." At Sunday's summit between Chinese President Hu Jintao and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the two nations said they were "deeply concerned" about the DPRK's prospective nuclear test, which "would be a great threat and would be unacceptable." For once the PRC finds itself in the same position as America: under pressure to actually make Pyongyang's actions seem unacceptable to Pyongyang.

However, Beijing long has feared a North Korean implosion more than a North Korean nuke: the former threatens chaos, conflict, refugees, and, perhaps most importantly, a united Korea allied with the United States on China's border. The PRC's reluctance to apply the sort of pressure that might actually work was evident when the Chinese Foreign Ministry declared itself "firmly against" any military action and called for a "peaceful resolution through consultation and dialogue," the DPRK's return to the six-party talks, and a "cool-headed" international response to the test.

How to persuade the PRC to act? The U.S. needs to convince China that the consequences of not acting might be worse: nuclear proliferation spreading to South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. That possibility has received increasing attention in the wake of Pyongyang's Sunday test. Washington need not threaten to arm its allies, but simply suggest that it might let events proceed naturally, refusing to thwart such a progression. China worries about Japan's increasing nationalistic assertiveness. The PRC is particularly concerned about independence-minded forces on Taiwan, which would like nothing more than to acquire a nuclear deterrent. A growing North Korean nuclear arsenal might be the trigger for a proliferation explosion.

Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute suggests encouraging a reluctant Beijing to cooperate by promising to withdraw U.S. forces and security guarantee to South Korea. Doing so would have the additional benefit of turning a nuclear North Korea into a regional rather than an American problem, and therefore make it more subject to a regional solution. Since American personnel are not needed to defend South Korea, but act as nuclear hostages for the North, U.S. disengagement was appropriate long ago.

Still, sanctions might fail even with Chinese support. Beijing provides about 70 percent of North Korea's oil as well as substantial amounts of food and other goods, but Kim Jong-il has demonstrated that he is willing to put his people through enormous pain and even mass starvation. Shen Dingli of Shanghai's Fudan University observes: "The DPRK considers its national interests to be greater than its relations with China." And Kim Jong-il might rationally, though unfortunately, believe that protecting those national interests requires possession of nuclear weapons.

An administration that long has exalted unilateral action and denigrated international cooperation finds itself in an uncomfortable position:  abject failure. Alas, it remains inclined towards bluster. Last week Christopher Hill, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, opined: "We are not going to live with a nuclear Noth Korea, we are not going to accept it."  However, the problem of North Korea has grown immeasurably worse in the more than five years that George W. Bush has been in office.

The best hope, as oft has been said, is a package of sticks and carrots. The former would be a coordinated program of economic pressure: international limits on international trade; South Korean restrictions on investment, commerce, and even humanitarian aid; Japanese termination of financial transfers from its ethnic Korean community; and Chinese reductions in food and fuel assistance. Combined with penalties would be a promise of full-scale international engagement, including recognition by Washington and trade with America, should the North return to international talks and agree to a verifiable process of denuclearization.

No one knows if it is still possible to peacefully halt the North's nuclear program. But if it is, Beijing-not America-is the key player. The United States should encourage Chinese participation and, if possible, leadership, in the campaign to defang Kim Jong-il.
                                   
Doug Bandow is vice president of policy for Citizen Outreach. He is a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy and the author of several books, including Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Xulon), The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea (co-author, Palgrave/Macmillan), and Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World (Cato Institute).