Power transitions inevitably cause heightened great power conflict. The stakes are high, and, in security affairs, it is a zero-sum conflict. Nonetheless, the course and outcome of the U.S.-China power transition is not predestined. The course of the conflict, including the likelihood of war, will be determined by leaders making discreet decisions, influenced by their personalities, domestic politics, including nationalism, and international dynamics. Equally important, the outcome of the transition will be influenced by decades-long economic and political trends in China and the United States. In this respect, despite China’s recent rise, the United States possesses many enduring advantages that can favor it over the long-term.

Check out other comments in this series from: Graham Allison, Gordon G. Chang, David Denoon, Michael Fabey, John Glaser, James Holmes, Lin Gang, Kishore Mahbubani, Robert Ross, Ruan Zongze, Robert Sutter, Xie Tao, Xu Feibiao and Wang Jisi. 

Dr. Ruan Zongze, Executive Vice President and Senior Fellow at the China Institute of International Studies:

The United States, make no mistake, will continue to be a major power, but the world is being ushered into a new era of an emerging multipolar global order. It is characterized by the unsettling direction of the U.S. and the rise of China. What happens between China and the United States will largely reshape the global geo-economic and geo-political landscape in the 21st century.

Conventional wisdom holds that the rise of the China means the demise of the United States. And the success of China in the World Trade Organization (WTO) means the failure of the WTO. The reality, however, tells a different story.

If history serves as a reminder, the China-U.S. relationship is by no means a zero-sum game. Surprisingly, recent history has shown that the relationship is productive as well as mutually beneficial.

Beijing and Washington forged strong ties to work to deter the Soviet threat during the Cold War period, to fight against terrorism after September 11, to prevent the global economy from collapsing amid the financial meltdown on Wall Street in 2008. Similarly China’s success in the WTO actually proves the success of the WTO as a whole, since it has brought about economic growth and prosperity for the rest of the world.

Nevertheless, now is a defining moment for the China-U.S. relationship. More than anybody in memory, President Donald Trump has challenged basic assumptions of the relationship that held true for the past four decades. The growing tensions between the world's top two economics have sparked debate and uncertainty over the future orientation of U.S.-China relations, and will definitely generate negative effects on the world economy.

Unlike the former Soviet Union, China has worked very hard to integrate itself into the current international system by recognizing de-facto American supremacy. Furthermore, China’s integration into the global system makes itself a stakeholder.

China is committed to champion an open world economy and a multilateral trade regime as global growth remains unsteady despite signs of recovery. Beijing called for concerted efforts in fostering new drivers for growth, promoting a more inclusive growth and improving global economic governance.

I trust that an eventual restoration of a more friendly and cooperative relationship should be expected. Yet Sino-American relations will head towards a bumpy road before they get better.

Check out other comments in this series from: Graham Allison, Gordon G. Chang, David Denoon, Michael Fabey, John Glaser, James Holmes, Lin Gang, Kishore Mahbubani, Robert Ross, Ruan Zongze, Robert Sutter, Xie Tao, Xu Feibiao and Wang Jisi. 

Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at George Washington University and author of U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present:

Self-absorbed and increasingly powerful, authoritarian China works covertly and overtly against American interests and influence at home and abroad. A populist domestic upsurge in American politics demands higher priority for U.S. interests. The result is the most substantial negative change in American policy toward China in fifty years. The Trump administration and congressional officials register broad anger and growing angst on how China over the years has unfairly taken advantage of America’s open economy and accommodating posture to strengthen Chinese power for use against U.S. leadership. The stakes are more serious today because China is widely seen as a peer competitor and the trajectory of the U.S.-China power balance is viewed as favoring Beijing.

American military, intelligence and domestic security departments are implementing administration strategies focusing on China as a predatory and revisionist rival seeking dominance. They have widespread support in Congress. Longstanding American concerns with China’s growing military challenges combine with newly prominent concerns about Beijing’s efforts to infiltrate and influence U.S. opinion and politics. Chinese state-directed exploitation of the U.S.-backed international economic order to weaken America and advance China’s economic capacity now pose an ominous challenge to American leadership in the modern economy.

Trump administration trade and investment policies have been conflicted; the recent focus on punitive tariffs is costly and controversial. American media and public opinion have begun to discern the overall grim turn in U.S. government polices against China but it’s unclear how far they will go in supporting the shift from past positive U.S. engagement with China. Americans seeking to accommodate Beijing and 'meet China half-way' likely will be drowned out by growing disclosures on how China has manipulated such positive American approaches to strengthen Beijing and weaken America. 

China is determined to pursue its current course. The impasse will grow. For now, neither side wants conflict or war, but both are prepared to test the other in advancing in such sensitive areas as improving U.S. ties with Taiwan and China’s widespread espionage and manipulation of American opinion. Chinese promises and reassurances count for little. A serious challenge or decline in China’s perceived power would alter American angst over the prospect of Chinese dominance, possibly allowing for more mutual accommodation.

Check out other comments in this series from: Graham Allison, Gordon G. Chang, David Denoon, Michael Fabey, John Glaser, James Holmes, Lin Gang, Kishore Mahbubani, Robert Ross, Ruan Zongze, Robert Sutter, Xie Tao, Xu Feibiao and Wang Jisi. 

Xie Tao, Professor at the School of English and International Studies at Beijing Foreign Studies University and author of Living with the Dragon: How the American Public Views the Rise of China:

Chinese leaders often hail economic cooperation as the “ballast” and the “propeller” of the U.S.-China relationship. Now that the two countries are fighting a hundred-billion-dollar trade war, is the ship of bilateral relations doomed to sink?

Not necessarily. There has been no anti-American protest since President Trump launched the trade war on July 6. The absence of such protests could imply that ordinary Chinese are not terribly upset by Trump’s hostile actions. And there is a good reason for them not to feel so, as initial concessions offered by Beijing—to reduce import tariffs, for example—mean cheaper foreign products and services for the average Chinese consumer. That is to say, the Chinese public does not seem to be in a mood for a sharp downturn in bilateral economic relations.

More important, given the Chinese government’s tight control over nationalist protests, muted public reactions could be a powerful signal that Beijing is still willing to seek a compromise with Washington. For one thing, such a war will probably harm the Chinese economy much more than it does the American economy. After all, the United States is China’s largest export market, and there is simply no alternative that is as big and lucrative as the American market.

Besides, Washington could retaliate by sharply curtailing China’s access to U.S. high technology. The Chinese economic juggernaut has been driven primarily by exports and investment, not by innovation. The fate of ZTE—a Chinese telecommunication giant sanctioned by the U.S. Commerce Department—amply illustrates China’s overwhelming dependence on American technology. In the high-tech realm at least, America is indispensable to China, but not the other way around.

If the above analysis is correct, then the trade war will likely wind down fairly soon. But Chinese willingness to compromise should not be interpreted as a sign of weakness, that is, as evidence that it pays to get tough on China. Admittedly, getting tough on China seems to be the new consensus in Washington, due to increasing concerns over Chinese influence in Western societies (so-called sharp power) as well as the perceived failure of Beijing to embrace democracy, adopt a market economy, and defer to American leadership.

The danger of this consensus, though, is that it will undoubtedly empower those in Beijing who are opposed to deepening political and economic reform. Getting tough on China may well produce a tougher China that sees no choice but to engage in intense and comprehensive competition—geopolitical, economic, and ideological—with Washington. But is America ready for a new cold war?

Check out other comments in this series from: Graham Allison, Gordon G. Chang, David Denoon, Michael Fabey, John Glaser, James Holmes, Lin Gang, Kishore Mahbubani, Robert Ross, Ruan Zongze, Robert Sutter, Xie Tao, Xu Feibiao and Wang Jisi.