America Still Needs an Asia Strategy
North Korea’s November 28 missile test, which involved an intercontinental ballistic missile that may be capable of reaching the United States, underscores the clear and present danger that Pyongyang poses to America. It also provides a resounding reminder about the dangerous implications for the United States of not having a clear, comprehensive and, above all, workable Asia strategy.
After President Donald Trump returned to the United States following a 12-day trip to Asia last month, he boasted of working with regional actors toward the goal of eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons. “We have to denuclearize North Korea,” he insisted.
Thirteen days later, Pyongyang launched the biggest and most powerful missile it had ever tested before, according to South Korean officials. The test bolstered the view of many nuclear experts that the notion of denuclearizing North Korea is fanciful. In effect, the White House is banking on a shaky plan with an objective that many experts believe to be wholly unachievable.
The absence of a U.S. strategy on Asia doesn’t just make Washington look clueless about North Korea. It also undermines America’s ever-tenuous leadership in the broader region.
This blow to U.S. leadership does not, however, equate to a net win for Beijing—yet. Our conversations with diplomats and analysts in the region make quite clear that America’s Asian partners still prefer a strong U.S. presence in order to balance China’s growing influence. They remain willing to wait for Washington to show up and lead. Make no mistake: Washington’s treaty allies in Asia have zero interest in jeopardizing the American defense umbrella at such a tumultuous moment in the region, with the North Korea threat and deepening volatility in the South China Sea making for a giant powder keg in the world’s most populous region.
Asian countries also still seek U.S. leadership in the economic sphere—even as China deepens its economic footprint in the region.
For America’s Asian allies, China’s growing economic influence is dangerous because it’s wielded in coercive ways. Beijing has a penchant for punishing countries economically in retaliation for policies considered inimical to its interests. In 2016, after South Korea announced its plan to deploy the missile defense system known as THAAD, Beijing declared this a threat to its security. It claimed that Washington could use THAAD radars to track Chinese missile activities. In retaliation, Beijing banned Korean television and films in China. Chinese state media called for a nationwide boycott on the large South Korean conglomerate that owned the land on which THAAD would be deployed. By March 2017, nearly half its stores on the Chinese mainland had been shuttered. Seoul has assured Beijing it won’t make any more THAAD deployments beyond the initial system laid out in September.
Invigorated U.S. economic engagement in Asia would offer the region a much-desired alternative to China. Admittedly, Washington faces an uphill climb given Trump’s withdrawal from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP)—a trade accord intended to reinforce U.S.-Asia linkages. Nonetheless, the opportunities still remain for Washington.
To his credit, Trump, while in Asia, did unveil a vision for the region, described as “a free and open Indo-Pacific,” which is meant to increase cooperation between the United States, Japan, Australia and India.
It remains to be seen, however, how this new vision will be implemented and what distinguishes it from Obama’s “rebalance” policy to Asia, which sought to deepen Washington’s economic, diplomatic and security engagement with that same Indo-Pacific region.
If there is to be an effective U.S. Asia strategy, it will have to view the region from a wider lens—one that enables Washington to unshackle itself from the strategic straitjacket that has long compelled America to regard Asia from the rigid context of U.S.-China regional competition. Indeed, U.S. Asia policy has long framed its relations with key Asian states (such as India, South Korea and, increasingly, Vietnam) as a subset of U.S.-China relations.