Third, allies should not expect the United States to work out the ins and outs of its policy toward China any time soon. Washington seeks to strengthen strategic stability with China, but the requirements of this objective are yet to be fleshed out and are matters of intense analysis and discussion. The U.S.-China relationship is large and complex, encompassing a global array of issues, and includes elements of both cooperation and competition. There will be times when American and Chinese interests may be more closely aligned than those of the United States and its allies. Understandingly, this basic fact feeds a growing fear among Northeast Asian allies that Washington will at some point be obliged to sacrifice them to advance relations with Beijing. The speculation is ungrounded. The United States fully appreciates its alliance commitments and the cost it would pay if it abandoned them. Tokyo and Seoul should rest assured that US officials and experts regularly remind Beijing of its obligations to its allies. Still, no single characterization will capture the many dimensions of the U.S.-China strategic relationship in the foreseeable future except in the most anodyne way: Allies will have to accept a lack of clarity and rein in the doubts it creates.

Fourth, while East Asia is playing a greater role in U.S. strategic thinking and is increasingly central to US policy, allies in this region should not expect Washington’s attention to be solely devoted to them. The United States will continue to have interests and alliance commitments elsewhere in the world, especially in the Middle East and Europe. Despite what promoters of the “Second Nuclear Age” have suggested since the late 1990s, and as is evident in recent developments in Iran and Ukraine, the nuclear future will not be written in Asia alone. Washington will have to remain active and engaged on several fronts. East Asia will remain a priority, however, and the American ability to walk and chew gum at the same time should be welcome in Tokyo and Seoul given their interests in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Finally, allies should not expect an end to the political dysfunction in Washington. The divisions that roil American politics will not be settled anytime soon and there is no indication that the zero-sum, take-no-prisoners approach to politics will end. The president and Congress will likely continue to be divided and the bar for responsible behavior may continue to be lowered. On occasions, the United States will send mixed signals and allies will be subject to a barrage of opinions. Still, it is important for allies to look beyond the all-too-familiar political cacophony in Washington and appreciate the depth of bipartisan support for the U.S. alliance system in East Asia and elsewhere, support that has been extraordinarily consistent since the end of World War II and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

Americans are quick to note that reassurance is never easy, while forgetting how hard it is to be reassured when your ally is capable of foreign-policy lurches, indulges in ahistorical reasoning, and permits domestic politics to override strategic assessments. To their credit, alliance managers “get it.” For the most part, our allies do too. The trick is building on that shared understanding to reach a wider audience still and ensure that U.S. alliances continue to defend and deter.

Brad Glosserman ([email protected]) is the Executive Director of the Pacific Forum CSIS. David Santoro ([email protected]) is the Senior Fellow for Nuclear Policy, also at the Pacific Forum CSIS.

Image: Wikimedia/Petty Officer 3rd Class Jason Johnston, U.S. Navy.