Sanctions aren’t likely to deter Iran from seeking nuclear weapons for at least three reasons. First, the Islamic Republic has faced U.S. sanctions since its inception, and these have become increasingly comprehensive in recent years. Pro-nuclear Iranian leaders would likely argue that sanctions could only be increased slightly if Tehran builds the bomb, and the Islamic Republic could easily absorb these.

Secondly, many influential parts of the Iranian regime, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, benefit from the sanctions. Incidentally, these are usually the same factions of the regime that are said to be the most pro-nuclear already. This is not unique to Iran. Some of the political science literature on nuclear proliferation suggests that only states that are isolated economically pursue nuclear weapons.

Thirdly, pro-bomb Iranian leaders would point to the examples of states like Pakistan and India in arguing that any increase in sanctions would be short-lived. Indeed, over the medium and long term, these leaders would argue, having the bomb would help Iran get the sanctions lifted as the international community would be forced to accept Tehran.

Positive inducements would be unlikely to deter Iran from building nuclear weapons for similar reasons. First, the United States would only offer limited positive inducements for Iran remaining nonnuclear. Second, many important factions in the Iranian regime would actually oppose Iran rejoining the international community and especially a rapprochement with the United States. This position would not be limited to the IRGC; many hardline clerics fear that a rapprochement with America would leave Iran vulnerable to U.S. culture exports. This would not only undercut their own influence but also leave Iran at risk to a so-called “color” revolution.

Third, an important faction inside Iran argues that a confrontational foreign policy best advances the country’s interest. According to this camp, by taking a hardline and assertive stance, Iran raises the costs of Israeli, Arab and American efforts to isolate it. Eventually, these costs will become so high that these countries will be forced to engage Iran from positions of weaknesses.

Pro-bomb elements of this foreign-policy faction would argue that nuclear weapons would be ideal in forcing its adversaries to come to terms with Iran. To back up their argument, they could point to the fact that the United States began exploring a rapprochement with Maoist China shortly after it became a nuclear weapon state. At the very least, they’d argue, the United States would be forced to create crisis mechanisms in order to reduce the possibility of a nuclear miscalculation between it and Iran or Israel and Iran. Proponents of a confrontational foreign policy would argue that Iran could use this initially limited engagement to effect a broader rapprochement.

In some ways, then, air strikes are likely the most effective means the United States currently has for deterring Iran from seeking atomic weapons. Iranian leaders regularly boast about their ability to deter and defend the nation from any external attack. Massive U.S. air strikes would demonstrate the hollowness of their claims, which would be a domestic embarrassment for the regime.

On the other hand, U.S. airstrikes would in many ways benefit Iran, particularly on the nuclear front. In fact, it’s likely that Iranian leaders believe airstrikes would be a necessary part of acquiring a nuclear weapon.

The Obama administration appears to believe that airstrikes would only be necessary if Iran made a clear, indisputable dash for the bomb. Alas, as is so often the case, the situation is not likely to be so black and white.

Rather, Iran would likely seize upon a crisis to justify taking an action that would provoke U.S. airstrikes while allowing Iran to retain plausible deniability. Most likely, Iran would use a breakdown of talks, more assassinations, a new cyberattack or significant new sanctions to justify kicking out international inspectors and/or withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Iranian leaders would frame their action as being a proportional response to the hostile action, while maintaining their peaceful nuclear intentions.

However, without international inspectors on the ground, the United States would have no way to verify Iran was not enriching weapons-grade uranium for use in a nuclear bomb. The U.S. president would face immense Congressional and allied pressure to order airstrikes before Tehran is able to acquire the necessary fissile material to construct a nuclear bomb. It’s likely that s/he would order airstrikes in short order.

Despite the setbacks mentioned above, Iran would gain tremendously from the military attack. Some of the benefits would be irrespective of its nuclear program, such as using the attack to reduce sectarian tensions in the greater Middle East. Most of the benefits would pertain to the nuclear program, however. By continuing to insist it never wavered from its peaceful intentions, Iran would use America’s “unprovoked” aggression to reduce international support for the sanctions. It would specifically aim to convince non-Western powers that defying the sanctions is necessary to show that the United States can’t impose its will on weaker powers by military force. This would resonate strongly in much of the world. Indeed, states that already resent the sanctions because of lost economic opportunities could use the U.S. airstrikes to justify no longer complying with them.

More importantly, U.S. airstrikes would allow Iranian leaders to justify actually building nuclear weapons. Since the inception of the nuclear crisis, Iranian leaders have repeatedly maintained that they are not pursuing nuclear arms. This includes Supreme Leader Khamenei issuing a fatwa declaring that nuclear weapons are against Islam. They will therefore need to find an excuse to justify reneging on those promises. A military attack would be the most convenient excuse for them to use. Iranian leaders could maintain that, while they didn’t want a nuclear arsenal, they have a sacred duty to protect the Iranian nation and Islamic world. As the airstrikes demonstrated, they cannot do this without a nuclear arsenal. Thus, Iranian leaders will claim that the United States had forced their hands.

Thus, the three main components of America’s current nonproliferation policy are ill-suited for deterring Iran from building a nuclear weapon. Complementing its current policy with a “deterrence by punishment” component would likely be much more effective. By convincing Iranian leaders that their own interests dictate remaining nonnuclear, they will be deterred from seeking a nuclear weapon.

 

Zachary Keck is the Managing Editor of The Diplomat. He can be found on Twitter: @ZacharyKeck.

Image: Iran president