Here is What I Saw at the Valdai Club Conference
The Valdai Club conference this year took place in an immense, usually empty hotel in the Caucasus Mountains above the town of Sochi. The hotel was built to host the 2014 G8 Summit, which (due to the Ukrainian crisis that year) never happened. That is why although the hotel is surrounded by beautiful mountains and forests, its patrons cannot enjoy them because they are restricted by security fences. In fact, the whole place has a certain air of the hotel from the The Shining, though for better or worse none of the participants resembled Jack Nicholson.
The conference contained no important developments or revelations, but it did raise some very interesting questions. One of those questions centered around the quality of leadership in Western democracies—specifically in a state that does not hold up well in comparison with the leadership of Russia or China. The West has maintained its leadership role through the legitimacy of its democratic institutions. In both the United States and Europe, however, those institutions appear to be crumbling as a result of deepening—and perhaps irreconcilable—cultural, racial and class differences, and a failure to address the issue of migration.
Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin seems to be in quite astonishingly good form for someone who is sixty-five years old and has been in power for eighteen years. Of course, no announcement has been made, but there can be no serious doubt that he will stand for election as president again next year (and win, naturally). On the other hand, there seem to be no real grounds for hope that his administration is capable of carrying out more effective reforms (barring some unexpected crisis).
Certainly we heard nothing about further deep economic reforms at the conference this year. If these reforms are at all possible under the system that Putin has created, then they will have to wait for the next Russian presidency in 2024; and, of course, one of the greatest tests of this system—as of any governing system—will be whether it survives the transition from its founder to his successor. Then again, given the present state of Western democracy, I was surprised to find that some of the Western conference participants had not modified their stance of Olympian superiority towards Russia on such issues.
On relations with the West, the statements and exchanges at the conference were of the “he said, she said” variety that have become so drearily familiar over the years. When one participant remarked that European leaders see the “ball in Russia’s court” when it comes to seeking a resolution of the Ukraine conflict under the terms of the Minsk agreement, Putin remarked that Russia sees the situation differently. Russia believes the ball is in the West’s court when it comes to bringing the government in Kiev to negotiate an agreement on autonomy with the Donbas, he said. Putin expressed no optimism about the situation and he noted that the Ukrainian government was probably too weak and internally threatened to make a deal.
I was surprised that there was no strong statement from Putin in defense of the Iran nuclear deal. Moscow appears to remain committed to the deal, but what I have gleamed from my conversations is that the Russian government hopes Germany, France and Britain will take the lead in standing up for that deal. A division will then appear in the Western camp, which Russia can observe from the sidelines without having to push itself forward.
Once upon a time, Putin’s administration would have hoped that the Europeans would form a bloc with Russia on this and other issues on which they agree, but after repeated disappointments that hope has faded. Judging by my conversations, however, it appears that the Russian establishment’s long-term goal is still to form a cooperative partnership with Germany to maintain stability in Europe in accordance with their common interests. Russia sees no possibility of this with Angela Merkel’s government, but—and this has not been sufficiently recognized in the West—this key long-term goal means that Russia is unlikely to take any step that would be seen in Berlin as directly threatening Germany. For example, it would be unwilling to put military pressure on the Baltic States or Poland (Russians treat Ukraine as a completely separate and unconnected case). Such action would completely wreck Russia’s long-term European strategy and deliver Russia wholly into the arms of China.
On North Korea, Putin said that “we should not drive North Korea into a corner, threaten force, stoop to unabashed rudeness or invective. Whether someone likes or dislikes the North Korean regime, we must not forget that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a sovereign state.”