Turkey is troubled by two interlocking polarizations, one ethnic, the other over the conservative-secular divide. ISIS has been embedded in both of these dimensions and doing its best to hit Turkey’s “critical vulnerabilities” and push all relevant sides face to off with each other in an increasingly antagonistic and even hostile manner.

ISIS’s role in the so-called Kurdish question is a complicated one. In Syria, the Syrian Kurds’ militia, YPG, has proven to be one of the most capable and motivated actors that are currently tackling ISIS on the ground. YPG’s fight is driven to a large extent by the desire to secure an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Syria. While Turkey has enjoyed warm relations with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, the Syrian Kurds present a different kind of problem for Turkey: since YPG and PKK are close affiliates (some might even argue that they are essentially the same organization), the rise of YPG poses a significant threat to Turkey, for it would pave the way for a territorial entity that could not only support and amplify but also “whitewash” PKK’s activities in Turkey.

In so many ways, both Turkey and the Kurds are natural enemies for ISIS. However, ISIS has so far masterfully ensured that both Turkey and the Kurds remain occupied with each other, provoking the “hawks” in both camps to suppress the voice of reason and put the blame for increasing tensions in the country on the other side, just like they did during the bombing attack in Ankara last year.

While the ethnic tensions are recognized by Western observers, the polarization between the seculars and AKP’s conservative followers are usually either downplayed or ignored entirely. However, the secular-conservative divide is real and becoming dangerously volatile. The anti-AKP seculars, who cannot defeat AKP in the elections simply because they lack the numbers and whose public protests, most notably the Gezi Park demonstrations of 2013, have been violently suppressed by the government, blame Erdogan not only for the increasingly unstable and volatile political atmosphere in Turkey, but also for the rise of ISIS.

One common theme among the seculars is the narrative that Erdogan, blinded by his desire to topple Assad, consciously contributed to the rise of ISIS either by directly supplying them with weapons or indirectly by “indulging” them. This narrative is partially fueled by the allegations that the Erdogan regime has been transferring weapons to undisclosed parties in Syria, but much of it comes from the “hatred” of Erdogan and what he stands for, which, for most seculars, is an Islamist ideology that does not differ all that much from that of ISIS’s.

So, when ISIS launches an attack, the seculars instantly put the blame on Erdogan (either for omission or commission, but usually both), who responds in kind, either directly or through his lieutenants, by suggesting that the attacks were carried out by PKK, who he claims is now being indirectly supported by at least some of the seculars, including the leader of the main opposition party. In a battle of narratives, all parties choose to believe what their own “side” champions, fueling the divide between the seculars and pro-AKP conservatives, which now seems irreconcilable. ISIS, on the other hand, watches silently from the sidelines.

Most countries from Britain to Jordan, or from France to the US, respond to terrorist attacks by unifying around a sense of national belonging. This is not the case for Turkey, not anymore. Each terrorist attack, launched either by ISIS or PKK, is driving different factions further away from each other, and toward further hostility. Turkey is not yet a broken nation, but it is most certainly—and perhaps irreversibly—fractured.

ISIS is not the cause of Turkey’s increasingly volatile, multidimensional fractures. But, just like it has done its homework at the operational level by exploiting the weakness in Ataturk Airport’s security apparatus, the group has also mastered the exploitation of Turkey’s critical vulnerabilities in the political sphere. Beyond the death and fear its attacks cause, ISIS is primarily acting as an enabler, assisting different factions in Turkey to dig their trenches even deeper and rip the country apart.

What can the Turkish government do about the ISIS threat? At the operational level, it has to engage in a heavy-handed (with a capital “H”) counterterrorism campaign that would identify and pacify not only ISIS operatives but also their sympathizers. This is a challenging task, but not as challenging as what needs to be done at the political level: alleviate the ethnic and political fractures that are pushing the country toward a cliff. Such task would require, as a first step, Erdogan to tone down his patronizing and bellicose rhetoric, which may then create a moment of calmness for different factions to start arguing with each other, as opposed to shouting at each other. As things stand, however, there is little reason to be optimistic; Turkey is suffering from what can be called collective insanity and no one seems interested in rational dialogue and common sense.

Unless Turkey addresses its operational and political challenges head on, ISIS will continue to exploit the country’s critical vulnerabilities and will keep on helping Turkey drive itself off the cliff, with chronic instability as well as ethnic and even greater—not to mention, much more violent—political strife waiting for it on the other side.

Burak Kadercan is an Assistant Professor of Strategy and Policy at the United States Naval War College. He has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and specializes in territorial and religious conflicts, the relationship between state-formation and production of military power, and empires. At the Naval War College, Kadercan lectures on the Islamic State as well as the legacies of the Ottoman Empire on present-day politics of the Middle East. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect those of the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Image: “151027-M-ED118-004 DOGANBEY, Turkey (Oct. 27, 2015) A Turkish Marine gives hand signals during an amphibious assault as part of exercise Egemen 2015 in Doganbey, Turkey,, Oct. 27. Egemen is a Turkish-led and hosted amphibious exercise designed to increase tactical proficiencies and interoperability among participants. The 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit is deployed to the 6th fleet area of responsibility in support of U.S. national security interests in Europe. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Jalen D. Phillips/ Released).”