Israel: Strategic Asset or American Protectorate?

Israel: Strategic Asset or American Protectorate?

The Hamas attack has eroded Israel's deterrence and its image of strength on the world stage.

By now, we need to burst the fairy tale that has evolved since Israel defeated two Soviet client states, Egypt and Syria, in 1967 and 1973, namely that Israel was a “strategic asset” of the United States.

There has clearly been close cooperation on many levels between the United States and Israel in the military and intelligence areas, and the Israelis did help ensure the survival of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, particularly during the Black September crisis in 197071. But even then, Israel was more of a client state that depended on American military and diplomatic support for its survival than a military ally.

To put it in simple terms, the United States would have contained and then defeated the Soviet Union during the Cold War without Israeli assistance. At the same time, the defeat of Egypt and Syria during the Yom Kippur War would not have occurred without American backing in 1973, including the placement of U.S. nuclear forces on the highest alert after the Soviet Union threatened to intervene. During all those years, Israel proved to be more of a strategic burden than a strategic asset regarding the U.S. position in the Middle East.

The close relations hurt U.S. status in the Arab and Muslim worlds, increased anti-Americanism there, and led, among other things, to the Arab oil embargo of 1973, not to mention numerous terrorist attacks targeting the United States. Israel had drawn the United States into the 1982 Lebanon War, a costly military and diplomatic American intervention that resulted in American civilian and military casualties.

Israel also pressed the Americans to organize the pathetic Iran-Contra Affair that damaged American credibility worldwide. With an ally and a strategic asset like that, who needs enemies?

It was, therefore, not surprising that American decision-makers have opposed the idea of a formal American-Israeli defense treaty, recognizing that the interests of Israel and the United States are not always compatible and that a strategic interdependence could be risky for both sides. That was the view shared by many Israeli statesmen, including former Israeli prime minister Yitzchak Rabin, who reiterated that Israel does not want American soldiers to fight and die defending the State of Israel. The Israelis would do the job by themselves!

Fast forward to 2023, under a Prime Minister who has spent his diplomatic career perpetrating the strategic asset fairy tale, telling American audiences that Israel is America’s “mighty aircraft carrier” in the Middle East, Israel has been transformed into an American protectorate whose survival now depends on the protection of two American aircraft carriers and that of 2,000 marines who may end-up fighting and dying to defend it. It is ironic that while right-wing pundits boasted that Benjamin Netanyahu had made Israel a military and technological world power, Israel is now exposed to the humiliating scene of the American president and secretary of state taking part in Israel’s war cabinet meetings and dictating to Israel—however softly—what it needs to do.

That is what happens when Israel loses its deterrence power. Normalizing Israel’s relations with the Arab Gulf States, including possibly Saudi Arabia, and establishing an American-led Arab-Israeli alliance was based on the perception that Israel was an unbeatable military and technological power that could deter Iran and its regional proxies. Like the kibbutzim in the Negev, this perception has become another victim of the Hamas attack.

Indeed, the American patron is now coming to Israel’s aid, substituting for the deterrence power it had lost. Consequently, it will demand Israeli compliance with its demands in return. However, like a good grandfather, Washington will do it with a warm hug.

Dr. Leon Hadar is a contributing editor with The National Interest, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in Philadelphia, and a former research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He has taught at American University in Washington, DC, and the University of Maryland, College Park. A columnist and blogger with Haaretz (Israel) and Washington correspondent for the Business Times of Singapore, he is a former United Nations bureau chief for the Jerusalem Post.

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