Yet, the United States has been dangerously adrift for more than two decades, operating without a positive and reassuring vision of its grand strategy. How can policymakers expend resources—“blood and treasure”—when it is not clear why they are doing so and for what purposes? Without clear objectives and goals in foreign policy—the Holy Grail of grand strategy—it is a virtual law of nature that societies will lose the sense of focus and purpose that give foreign policy strategic direction and momentum. What follows like an inexorable law of nature is perpetual drift, as a nation’s foreign policy swings from strong public support for fighting wars (Afghanistan and Iraq) to public opposition and then to indifference. For example, while the level of domestic support for the initial invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was 90 percent,[12] a decade later 56 percent support the withdrawal of most U.S. forces from Afghanistan by 2014.[13]

Lastly, the failure to develop a grand strategy contributes to debates about America’s relative decline in power. The United States faces grinding wars without end, a deep economic crisis, the emergence of authoritarian powers such as China and Russia (perhaps as the leaders of an emerging authoritarian axis with Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Venezuela), deep worries about the future, and no clear sense of purpose. How could the society not worry about decline?

Faint Outlines of a Solution

As for a solution to this problem, it is useful to recognize where these scholars and practitioners agree and disagree. Differences exist in the various approaches to organizing a coherent set of principles around foreign policy. For some, the solution lies in organizing our thinking by focusing on the states that pose the greatest challenges. For others, however, the preferred approach entails thinking in terms of what we often call transnational issues—challenges, such as proliferation or extremism, which transcend individual states and regions. For others still, the best approach is to focus on regions, such as Asia and the Middle East.

There is broad agreement that grand strategy is more art than science. While each type of study of grand strategy—historical, social scientific, policy-oriented, and the military strategic—has its strengths and weaknesses, they all either implicitly or explicitly recognize that grand strategy is a highly subjective undertaking. It does not offer an objective, scientific, precise, or linear formula for determining what the state should do or what policies it should pursue. Furthermore, it is difficult to predict the “results” of a given grand strategy, because those often are based upon judgments about future trends and a complex array of political, economic, and social variables. However, for grand strategy to be effective, it is imperative for the state to clearly articulate the goals it intends to accomplish, and how these will be achieved.

What is equally clear is that grand strategy is a never-ending process, which must be constantly updated and adapted by scholars and policymakers to ensure that its ends and means are closely aligned. By articulating the goals for the world it seeks to build, the state addresses the real purpose of grand strategy, which is to express the principles that provide order to its beliefs and expectations about the world it wants to create and the domestic and foreign policies that it will pursue to accomplish that objective.

In essence, grand strategy is not governed by strict scientific laws but by rules of thumb or rough guidelines that allow policymakers to practice the art of making informed judgments about long-term trends and trade-offs. Finding the right balance between the three principles, then, is always going to have an irreducible degree of subjectivity and uncertainty. There will never be one, right answer to what a state’s grand strategy should be. Rather it is a matter of choosing between grand strategies that are better than others across a range of options. The issue of trade-offs is crucial, as George H. W. Bush wisely observed: “The essence of strategy is determining priorities” and then making “the hard choices.”[14] It is the trade-offs that make the choices “hard.” In effect, prioritizing one policy necessarily means de-prioritizing another, while emphasizing one principle necessarily means de-emphasizing another. The question is how to weigh these trade-offs in grand strategy over time, especially when those are complex and likely to occur and reoccur over decades. The rules of thumb outlined here offer broad guidance.

Three Rules of Thumb

Up to this point, our discussion has focused largely on the historical and analytical underpinnings that have shaped the evolution of grand strategy and the principles to guide foreign policy. For this book to remain relevant and contribute advice and strategic direction on America’s evolving role in the world, we must now look forward. The discussion since the end of the Cold War has proven particularly interesting, as both scholars and policymakers have struggled with developing a coherent American grand strategy that helps the nation deal with the modern world and offers recommendations for achieving such an objective. The remainder of this chapter is written as a contribution to the development of a more clear, confident, and optimistic trajectory for American grand strategy.

The first rule of thumb is that the U.S. cannot afford to have “domestic policy” or “foreign policy” presidents in the post-Cold War era. Bill Clinton’s agenda was heavily domestic policy oriented, while George W. Bush’s was heavily foreign policy oriented. Both left the United States vulnerable in the areas they neglected when they left office. Looking forward, the president’s policy agenda has to strike a careful balance among the three principles of grand strategy. So the first rule of thumb for balancing between the principles is to strike a delicate balance between the nation’s foreign and domestic policy agendas. The reality is that neither should dominate, and neither should be neglected. The United States cannot for long afford to get this balance wrong.

While in an earlier era the United States could afford to disregard foreign problems, it no longer has this option. States in Asia, for example, are deeply troubled at the thought of America’s withdrawal from the Pacific, particularly with China’s increasingly assertive and aggressive actions in its near abroad.[15] A domestically oriented U.S. would signal to the world that Washington is less interested in foreign policy, but which Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang likely would interpret as an invitation to operate more aggressively while expanding their reach. However, if the United States fails to devote significant political and economic attention and resources to rebuilding the domestic foundations of its national power, it will be increasingly difficult to compete in the world. The consequence will be the greater risk of an erosion of the American people’s willingness to support a leadership role for the U.S. The nation may be experiencing weariness in terms of supporting the costs and burdens of global leadership.

The second rule of thumb is that a president has to lead the American people but also respect their role as a check on idealism. Most American voters do not gravitate to Wilsonian or neoconservative ideals, but they have an innate sense of optimism about life in America, matched by a healthy skepticism about efforts to remake the world in America’s image. To be sure, there are numerous examples in which democratic societies are incited toward exuberance for war and the prospect for radical political change, but have a sense of costs and benefits that should be respected.[16] This does not mean the president should conduct foreign policy by poll, but it points strongly toward the principle that policymakers should show respect for the preference for gradualism that runs deeply in American politics. As Mead points out, the American people are woefully ignorant about foreign policy, world history, and basic geography.[17] It is equally true, however, American grand strategy derives largely from the people. The public has good instincts when they see a severe imbalance in foreign policy, and are instrumental in helping policymakers find exactly the right balance that accords with public sentiments.

The third rule of thumb is to have and put into practice policies that show a preference for gradualism. As discussed earlier, gradualism is the aspect of American foreign policy exceptionalism that sets it apart from both status quo and revolutionary powers. It rests on the idea that the United States has the power to change the world for the better, while noting that such change usually happens slowly and incrementally, rather than as a product of sudden and dramatic shifts. Grand strategies that call for defeating tyranny, terrorism, illegal drugs, state failure, poverty, or fighting a “war to end all wars” are largely inconsistent with American foreign policy principles and likely to fail. This is not to argue that we should acquiesce to these terrible conditions, but a prudent grand strategy, if practiced wisely, must reflect some self-awareness that we cannot solve problems quickly or solve them alone. Eras of great success in the conduct of American grand strategy were all marked by the combination of modest ambitions and the slow, incremental successes often produced by diplomacy and other instruments of policy. A crucial exception is the case of the Second World War but that victory was won as a result of strong alliances and close partnerships, and thus it remains the exception that proves the rule.