Is There Still Time for Diplomacy With North Korea?

North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un looks on during the test-fire of inter-continental ballistic missile Hwasong-14 in this undated photo released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang, July, 4 2017. KCNA/via REUTERS

Could diplomacy stave off a military showdown?

North Korea’s first test of a missile able to reach the United States has predictably set off a firestorm of speculation about the Trump administration’s next steps. The test should not be a surprise since Kim Jong-un forecast it in a speech in January this year. It is surprising however, to watch the U.S. foreign policy community propose unrealistic solutions that offer no chance of success.

Some talk about accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state and providing Pyongyang with assistance to help it stave off what they believe is a humanitarian disaster—a fairly severe drought—facing the North Korean people. Still others argue that China should accept sole responsibility for denuclearizing Pyongyang, going beyond stepping up sanctions to reaching a deal with the North providing a security assurance and assistance in return for it tamping down its nuclear program. How to convince China to take that drastic step and why North Korea would want a security assurance from China, not the United States, its main enemy, is left for others to figure out. And then of course there is the ever-present group advocating tougher sanctions on China, North Korea and anyone and anything else that can be sanctioned to punish Pyongyang. But pressing this policy default button isn’t going to stop Pyongyang from moving forward.

The Trump administration has reached this entirely predictable moment of truth, the result of two serious miscalculations. First, the administration put too much faith in China and its willingness to apply effective pressure on the North. Second, Washington underestimated North Korean determination to resist any sort of pressure, whether economic from the Chinese or American military threats. U.S.-Chinese cooperation has now deteriorated as a result of Washington’s frustration, North Korea has conducted its first test of a ballistic missile able to reach Alaska, and the administration may be on a slippery slope to either war or having to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.

These developments have drowned out a muffled but consistent drumbeat out of Pyongyang since November, a willingness to reengage with the Trump administration, to start a dialogue with neither side having the right to demand preconditions for talking. That drumbeat has become apparent in a series of private bilateral meetings between North Korean government officials with ties to their leadership—and American experts. The Trump administration, to its credit, has picked up on this drumbeat, most recently sending a State Department diplomat to meet the North Koreans in Oslo.

This window for diplomacy may still be open but isn’t likely to stay open for much longer. Lost in the media scrum over the North Korean ICBM launch is a significant statement by Kim Jong-un following the test that he would not put the nuclear and missile programs on the negotiating table until after the United States stops its hostile policy and its threats against the North. For experts with a lifetime of reading North Korean tea leaves, that statement is much more explicit than any he has made in the past. It means that the North Korean nuclear and missile programs are up for discussion under the right conditions. That is significant. It also echoes what North Korean government officials have been hinting at for months now in private sessions.

Before the Trump administration moves to harsher, potentially more dangerous steps, it owes our allies in the region as well as the American people to explore whether diplomacy is still possible. First, the administration should step up informal U.S.-North Korean diplomatic contacts that have already taken place. Second, Washington should explore whether it is possible to reach an initial temporary arrangement on what the North Koreans call “confidence building measures” that could cool tensions and provide some breathing space for the resumption of formal negotiations intended to explore whether a peaceful path forward in dealing with the North Korean nuclear and missile challenge is possible.

The surest way to achieve this objective is to seek a moratorium on North Korean missile and nuclear testing in return for the United States and South Korea agreeing to suspend joint military exercises. This would be an initial temporary step short of a more far-reaching freeze on North Korea’s programs, including the production of bomb-making material, that would have to be the subject of detailed talks. Of course, a total cessation would be unacceptable and the North Koreans know that. But exploring the suspension of exercises that the North finds most objectionable—the largest ones held twice a year in late winter and summer that involve tens of thousands of troops—might provide a path forward. This scaling back of exercises has also been publicly supported by China and Russia.

Pages