U.S.-China Relations Remain Fragile Despite Blinken’s Visit

China-US

U.S.-China Relations Remain Fragile Despite Blinken’s Visit

The Biden administration needs to be more clear-eyed about the extent and practicality of stabilizing relations with China after years of adversarial postures from both sides.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Beijing from June 18–19 in an attempt to dial down tensions between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and rekindle high-level communication channels to steady their wobbling bilateral relationship. Blinken’s trip marks the first for a U.S. secretary of state to travel to China since 2018, and he is also the highest-ranking American official to visit since the inauguration of President Joe Biden in January 2021.

In the context of worsening U.S.-PRC relations, Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali last November and agreed to tackle their disagreements responsibly. Blinken originally planned to visit Beijing in February this year. But he scuttled the trip soon after the United States detected and shot down a high-altitude balloon that U.S. intelligence says was used for espionage over North America.

In the intervening months after downing the PRC’s spy balloon, U.S.-China relations declined precipitously. Military-to-military contacts between Washington and Beijing have stalled. Yet, dangerously close encounters between the two militaries by air and sea have not ceased, as shown by the recent near collisions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, the United States has stepped up its support for Taiwan while charging Beijing for considering to give lethal support to Russia for Putin’s aggressions on Ukraine and strengthening the Chinese espionage base in Cuba to intercept and eavesdrop on signals and communication messages crucial to U.S. national security.

Recognizing the dangers accompanying a lack of dialogue, the Biden administration has sought a “thaw” in relations with Beijing. Beijing, however, has countered, accusing Washington of promoting a duplicitous two-pronged approach—seeking dialogue to set up “guardrails” with China on the one hand and forcibly containing China’s legitimate strategic and economic interests on the other. Congress enacting restrictions on the semiconductor trade and mobilizing allies across Europe and Indo-Pacific against the PRC are notable examples.

Thus, when Blinken arrived in Beijing, it’s no wonder his hosts were eager to put the onus of redressing U.S.-China relations on Washington. PRC Foreign Minister Qin Gang claimed “that the China-U.S. relationship is at the lowest point” since 1979. Wang Yi, the top foreign affairs official of the Chinese Communist Party, attributed the “root cause” of deterioration to Washington’s “misperceptions toward China.” He demanded that the United States “reflect upon itself” and stop inflating the "China threat.” President Xi posited that the international community expects Washington and Beijing to “coexist in peace and have friendly and cooperative relations.” The Chinese leader asked Blinken to “make more positive contributions to stabilizing China-U.S. relations.”

Blinken’s Three Objectives and Outcomes

Secretary Blinken communicated that the Biden administration values a responsible relationship between Washington and Beijing. He set out three objectives for this trip, all predicated upon an overarching principle: “intense competition requires sustained diplomacy to ensure that competition does not veer into confrontation or conflict.”

First, it is necessary to reopen lines of communication so both powers can responsibly manage their relationship and avoid misunderstandings. Second, Blinken asserted the significance of advancing the interests and values of the United States and its allies and partners, including “speaking directly and candidly” about these concerns with Beijing. Thirdly, he believes the two nations can jointly “explore the potential for cooperation on transnational challenges.”

How many of these objectives did Blinken achieve in his two-day whirlwind visit to Beijing? According to the secretary’s press conference after his meeting with Xi Jinping and the State Department readout concluding the visit, there were no breakthroughs. This outcome was expected, but there are optimistic signs that communication is back on track, and both nations recognize the urgency to halt a downward spiral in relations. The State Department described the meetings as “candid, substantive, and constructive.” China’s Foreign Ministry reported “candid, in-depth and constructive talks at length on the overall bilateral ties and important issues.” Beijing also voiced the need to build “a stable, predictable and constructive relationship with the U.S.”

On areas of possible cooperation, the United States and China promised to reinforce “people-to-people” exchanges between students, scholars, and businesses, as well as increase direct flights between the two countries. Transnational issues like climate change, North Korea’s nuclear program, global economic stability, food security, international health, and the fentanyl crisis were also identified as areas for future discussion and collaboration.

Yet, for areas of contentions, deep fissures remain. Though Beijing has reassured the secretary that “it is not and will not provide lethal assistance to Russia for use in Ukraine,” and Blinken confirmed there is no evidence contradicting that, he still raised concerns that Chinese companies “may be providing technology” for Moscow to bolster their military capacity. Indeed, in China, the ubiquitous influence of the CCP makes it challenging to distinguish between transactions made by state-owned businesses from those of private enterprises.

As the United States and its allies stepped up efforts to ban China from access to advanced and sensitive technologies crucial to military and economic dominance, Beijing has as well taken punitive actions on American and foreign businesses operating domestically. Blinken sought to “disabuse” the Chinese view that the United States was aiming at “economically containing” or “decoupling” from China. He explained that the United States is merely “de-risking,” or “investing in our own capacities and in secure, resilient supply chains; pushing for level playing fields for our workers and our companies; defending against harmful trade practice; and protecting our critical technologies so that they aren’t used against us.” This is in line with the notion of “small yard and high fence” coined by Jake Sullivan, Biden’s national security advisor, referring to “implementing carefully tailored restrictions on the most advanced semiconductor technology exports to China, premised on straightforward national security concerns.” The PRC wasn’t persuaded, as Wang asked the Blinken to “lift illegal unilateral sanctions against China, stop suppressing China's scientific and technological advances.” Xi told Blinken “neither side should try to shape the other side by its own will, still less deprive the other side of its legitimate right to development."

Differences over Taiwan

The Taiwan Strait remains the most rancorous sticking point for the United States and China. Beijing asserted that Taiwan is the “core of China’s core interests,” which “has no room for compromise or concession.” Blinken, nonetheless, reiterated the one-China policy mantra derived from the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. He reminded Beijing of “the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.” The United States “does not support Taiwan independence” and is “opposed to any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side.” Washington insists on the peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences and meeting its responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act, including ensuring that the island democracy can defend itself from invasion.

Regarding crisis management, the Xi government has rebuffed Blinken’s persistent requests to restart the military-to-military engagement put on hold since Pelosi’s Taiwan visit last year. The confrontational incidents between their respective fighter jets in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait have made restoring these connections highly relevant. Still, Beijing may continue to act recklessly and brazenly in these scenarios to deter U.S. military movements.

Biden’s Optimism and Reality Check

It is unclear whether high-level diplomacy can meaningfully change the trajectory of U.S.-Chinese relations, which is still veering toward greater antagonism. But at the very least, resuming talks and contacts will allow each side to convey their intentions more clearly. Blinken’s visit will likely pave the way for more high-level official meetings between Washington and Beijing, including potential visits from Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, and Climate Envoy John Kerry in the coming months. Beijing is particularly interested in meeting with American officials in charge of economic policy given China’s economic slowdown and their anxiousness over Washington’s bans on foreign investment and export of high-technologies to China. Xi is reportedly looking forward to his first visit to the United States since 2017 to attend the APEC meeting in San Francisco, where he is expected to meet with Biden.

Domestic politics, however, are at play. The Biden administration has already received mounting criticisms from congressional Republicans for slow-walking the delivery of weapons to Taiwan and the investigations into the February spy balloon incident and the origins of COVID-19. While calling Xi a “dictator” kept in the dark about the spy balloon incursion, Biden argued that the incident was more “embarrassing than intentional” for Beijing. The president plans to meet with his Chinese counterpart again to talk about their “legitimate differences” and areas where they can get along.

The president’s optimism aside, it remains an objective fact that U.S.-PRC relations are so brittle and their mutual trust level so low that any new conflicts can plunge their fragile détente into another disequilibrium. The PRC’s growing power and ambitions cannot but lead to heightened anxieties and vigilant responses from Washington. The January and November 2024 Presidential Elections in Taiwan and the United States, respectively, will introduce new uncertainties. Beijing’s belligerent reactions toward Pelosi’s Taiwan trip last August and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s transits to America this April illustrated how the island’s upcoming political transition—assuming another more nationalist candidate is elected—may further sharpen Xi’s conviction that the situation requires further escalation or even invasion. Come November 2024, Biden’s intense competition with the PRC may not be sufficient to satisfy the burgeoning domestic and bipartisan anti-China sentiments and ensure his reelection. A more hawkish White House will derail the modus vivendi that Blinken has worked so assiduously to reconstruct.