Why Germany Won’t Go Nuclear

December 5, 2022 Topic: Germany Region: Europe Tags: GermanyNuclear WeaponsDeterrenceRussia-Ukraine WarNATO

Why Germany Won’t Go Nuclear

Germans contemplating the size of the needed investment, the risks associated with its existence, and the consequences of its use are unlikely to opt for this path.

In practice, a counter-value posture is the most Germany could militarily afford or operate, perhaps no larger than the French or British arsenals of 200-300 warheads each. All things considered, the costs and operational constraints would argue for a German nuclear arsenal aimed at killing millions of Russians rather than defanging the huge Russian nuclear force. How tolerable would this be to Russians or the German public? Not very, in our opinion.

Germany Becomes the Target

This brief military assessment raises perhaps the greatest conundrum for any German leader contemplating an independent nuclear strike force. Its very existence would increase the chances of national destruction through Russian preemption in a deep crisis or war. Moreover, any contemplated use has little credibility. Initial German tactical use as a warning might trigger a damage-limiting Russian strike. Any full-blown use would guarantee Germany’s utter destruction. Germans contemplating the size of the needed investment, the risks associated with its existence, and the consequences of its use—killing millions of innocent Russians and inviting the retaliatory destruction of their own country—are unlikely to opt for this path.

No country wants to be a nuclear battlefield. Were Germany to build and deploy nuclear-armed systems, it is obvious that countries between Germany and Russia—Poland, Ukraine, etc.—might view their position as uncomfortable. Even if Berlin committed itself to using nuclear arms only in defense, a German umbrella wielded by authorities in Berlin might give Warsaw and Kyiv pause. Consultations in a crisis or war, moreover, could provide the very signal for preemptive Russian action.

Foreseeable Future: A Vanishingly Small Probability

No intelligence or defense analyst who has lived through the collapse of the Soviet Union or the rise of international terrorism is likely to deny categorically the possibility of a low-probability future. We believe it would take far more drastic geopolitical changes than we have seen or anticipate for Germany to turn to developing its own nuclear weapons. Moreover, the dimensions of those changes would be difficult to miss. If such tectonic shifts occur, a nuclear Germany would be only one of many disturbing outcomes.

Drs. Roger George and Robert Levine are former political and military intelligence analysts and have taught national security strategy at the U.S. National War College. They are co-editing a forthcoming book on CIA Analysis: Voices From Inside.

Image: Reuters.