This leads some Iran-watchers to conclude that a subset, at the
least, of pragmatic conservatives will adapt to new realities,
including an accommodation with the United States on terrorism and
Israel. When that time comes, it will be the end of the Islamic
Republic as configured since 1979, but it will not necessarily herald
a new era of broad reform. Indeed, many Iranian reformers worry that
the conservatives will make a deal with the Americans, changing their
foreign policy in return for Washington's silence about Iran's
democracy and human rights deficits. Iranian reformers have reason to
worry about such a scenario. They note that the U.S. government was
able, after September 11, to rapidly shift policies toward Pakistan
and Uzbekistan once it became clear these countries would support the
U.S. war on terrorism.

It is also simply logical that conservatives would consider such a
deal. They know it is a vital U.S. interest that the terror against
Israel stop. If Iran, in effect, "walked away" from the Arab-Israeli
conflict it would be easier for the Bush Administration to adopt a
new policy of engagement. This would be a major breakthrough for the
United States since the Iranian involvement in the Arab-Israeli
conflict has been the most debilitating element of the relationship
in recent years. But a less aggressive U.S. attitude toward Iran
could also deflate pressures to weaponize its nuclear
infrastructure--and here is where an additional positive payoff for
the United States could materialize.

Of course, such a deal is a matter of speculation. It is easier for
the U.S. government to change its position on Iran than vice versa.
If President Bush decided to make a new overture to the Islamic
Republic, he would face some opposition within his administration and
on Capitol Hill, but he would be able to proceed without fear of
impeachment or worse. The situation in Tehran is very different,
especially concerning the first moves toward an official dialogue.
All the competing factions in Tehran know that the group which first
establishes better relations with Washington will gain political
advantage. They will be the ones praised for common sense and for
doing what is best for Iran. Consequently, their opponents can be
counted upon to do all they can to prevent such a thing from
happening, including strategic leaks designed to undermine any
diplomacy in prospect. This can only be prevented if the Supreme
Leader and the President, together, decide to change policy, and do
so in such a way that neither can easily renege on the effort.

It will be difficult for them to do this, except in an emergency.
Perhaps such an emergency will be produced by U.S. reaction to
Iranian meddling in post-Ba'athi Iraq. Perhaps some other
unpredictable event may come to pass, or perhaps the emergency will
be generated domestically. The point, however, is that the regime can
and might change its policies, and the United States should be ready
to take advantage of those changes if and when they occur.

Re-assessing U.S. Policy

Short of invasion and occupation of Iran, there is no sure way to
stop its terrorist activities or its bomb program. But both
activities can be slowed down, and can perhaps be stopped. The Bush
Administration should develop a practical plan to try to persuade
Iran to change its behavior, and to convince the Iranian leadership
that dialogue and mutual restraint are to their advantage. If it
tries and fails, the eventual use of force may still be required, but
at least everyone would know that the United States made a good faith
effort to avoid such a course.

So far, however, no such effort is discernable. The administration's
public statements about U.S.-Iranian relations have mixed threats and
platitudes without saying anything practical about how the two sides
might defuse a dangerous relationship. Iran has been designated
"evil", with all the attendant threats implicit in the doctrine of
"with us or against us", yet the President has also stated that "U.S.
policy is not to impose change on Iran but to support the Iranian
people in their quest to decide their own destiny." The President has
further promised that "as Iran's people move forward towards a future
defined by greater freedom, greater tolerance, they will have no
better friend than the United States of America." Sounds nice, but as
a practical guide, such remarks are not much use, and Iranians may be
excused if they are confused as to what all this means.

It is not at all clear what the administration plans to do with
respect to Iran now that Ba'athi Iraq is no more. What it will not do
seems more evident: it will not invade Iran. Several administration
officials and high-level supporters have stressed that there are no
cookie-cutter solutions for "axis of evil" members and other
countries whose behavior makes them problems in the war against
terrorism. They have stressed that positive developments are taking
place within Iranian society, and they know that U.S. pressure,
especially military pressure, could be counterproductive. But knowing
what not to do, while important, is not enough. Indeed, how the
administration handles Iran in a post-Saddam environment will be of
critical importance.

A good place to start is to understand that the Iranian regime
believes that on several previous occasions it has made important
gestures that have been rejected by the United States. In his 1989
inaugural address, President George H.W. Bush urged Iran to help in
the release of U.S. hostages in Lebanon and said that "good will
begets good will." When the hostages were released, Iran claims it
received no good will. At the end of the first Gulf War in 1991, Iran
expected to be consulted on the postwar political and security
environment, in view of its quiescence during that conflict. It was
not consulted. In 1996, President Rafsanjani agreed to offer an
American oil company, Conoco, a major energy deal. This was rejected
by the Clinton Administration and was abruptly followed by enhanced
economic sanctions. During the Afghan campaign in the autumn of 2001,
Iran believed it had cooperated, both during and after the war, only
to be placed on the "axis of evil" the following January.

All of this suggests that the Iranians may be more flexible than we
think. It does not mean that a policy bedecked with some carrots will
not require sticks in readiness, as well. For example, the United
States must face down Iranian attempts to hijack the post-Ba'athi
political situation, if indeed any such serious attempt is afoot. It
must also pursue both a unilateral and multilateral policy toward
Iran. If the hardliners continue to promote violence against Israel
and accelerate their bomb program, U.S. military options cannot be
ruled out, and the U.S. government would not be remiss in saying so.
Such options cover the gamut from air strikes against Hizballah
targets in Lebanon, Syria and Iran to covert operations or a direct
assault on Iran's nuclear facilities.

But it would be better if Iran's relations with Israel were to
change, and if Iran curtails its support for the extremist groups.
Clearly, the preferred U.S. option should be a new initiative to
confront the Iranian terror campaign and its nuclear program on all
fronts, using a mixture of political and economic carrots and sticks.
This will require a much more nuanced American policy that, as a
lodestone, accepts that Iran has genuine national security concerns.

In essence, the United States needs to pursue a concerted policy of
cooperative containment of Iran. This will require working closely
with Russia, China, the EU and the United Nations Security Council to
ensure that if any further nuclear technology is to be provided to
Iran it must be under the new IAEA safeguards as provided by the
additional protocol. Of course, the United States has tried such an
approach in the past, and the record has been mixed. The Clinton
Administration made great efforts to stop China, Russia, North Korea
and several European countries from providing Iran with
nuclear-related technologies. There has been some success with China;
with Russia, the record has been unsatisfactory.

While the Russians have agreed with the United States that an Iranian
nuclear program would be in no one's interest, its own commercial
interests have trumped any long-term security considerations. To
persuade the Russians that they should change their policies will
require compromise. Two former Clinton Administration officials have
suggested a number of options. These include an acceptance of
Russia's deal to build the nuclear reactor at Bushehr, provided it
restricts assistance to building light water reactors and training.
All other nuclear cooperation that could assist Iran with a fuel
cycle would end. Russia would insist that all fuel for Bushehr be
supplied by Russia and spent fuel be returned. In return, Russia
would be offered a number of lucrative nuclear deals in the United
States. Other potential suppliers of specific equipment to Iran, such
as the Czech Republic and Ukraine, continue to be subject to American
pressure, and that is good. There can be no let up in this regard,
and it may require strong arm-twisting by the United States to assure
compliance.

Essay Types: Essay