At the multilateral level, the cooperation of the UN Security Council
and the EU is essential. Since Iran is a party to the NPT, the
Security Council has ultimate responsibility to determine whether
Iran is in violation of it. If Iran refuses to sign the additional
protocol, it will confirm suspicions about its intentions. Under its
current agreement with the IAEA, Iran is only obliged to disclose new
nuclear facilities three months before they become operational. At
that point, the new declared facilities are open to IAEA inspections.
Under the additional protocol, signatories are subject to surprise
inspections of suspected undisclosed facilities. This makes it much
more likely, but by no means certain, that illegal activity will be
detected. To date Iran has put off signing the additional protocol,
arguing that it will only do so when all restrictions on its purchase
of civilian nuclear technology are lifted. Washington must insist
that the IAEA take a tough line on this matter, if only to convince
the IAEA hierarchy that if they fail with Iran following debacles in
Iraq prior to 1990 and North Korea, they should look for a new line
of employment.

The EU can play a more assertive role, as well. Until recently,
U.S.-EU approaches to Iranian policy have differed on methods, if not
objectives. However, a new EU-Iranian initiative to negotiate a Trade
and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) has elements that should be welcomed
in Washington. The EU has declared that the trade discussions with
Iran are inextricably linked to progress on three non-trade items
including the Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction.

The TCA negotiations, however, will be carried out by the office of the European Commissioner responsible for external relations, Chris Patten. The TCA will cover trade and human rights. Its final approval rests with the Council of the EU, with the assent of the European Parliament. In parallel, a Declaration of the Council of the EU would be issued concerning benchmarks, to which Iran must agree, on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the Arab-Israeli peace process. EU officials have assured their American counterparts that the political agenda is critical to the overall package. They argue there will be de facto, if not de jure, linkage and that they are under pressure from their own governments to make sure this is the case. They insist that one requirement within the WMD package will be that Iran ratify the additional NPT protocol.

There will be European pressure groups that will strive to minimize the linkage between politics and economic transactions. This, of course, would be nothing new, as all former European efforts at "constructive engagement" have been mostly foils against which to sell things to the supposedly targeted countries. Iran obviously has every interest in de-linking the two sets of issues, and history provides them confidence they will succeed. They will focus on the economic component while hinting, not too subtly, that it is a "take it or leave it" proposition.

They must not succeed. How Europe handles these negotiations will be a critical test of its seriousness on the political agenda. If the Europeans wish to be genuine allies of the United States, they must act seriously in those domains where they have the ability to do so. For its part, however, the United States must work closely with the EU to ensure that the political issues are kept on the front burner, and that the Iranians are made to understand that the linkages are real. This should not be difficult if the will is present. After all, it is in fact the EU--a vastly larger, richer and more powerful entity than Iran--that can more easily afford to walk away from the negotiations and take its trade elsewhere.

The United States and the EU also share a strong common interest in advancing the Arab-Israeli peace process and Iraqi reconstruction. Europe, as much as America, has a great deal at stake. However, it makes no sense for the EU to keep pressuring the United States and Israel to move toward a final settlement unless the EU itself is prepared to do much more to stop Palestinian terrorism. The EU should start by adopting the same criteria used by the U.S. government for penalizing countries and institutions that provide financial and military support for Hizballah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This applies especially to Syria and Iran and should be an EU priority. Concerning Iraq, the United States will find it easier to solicit EU cooperation on Iran if the EU is encouraged to play a role in post-Ba'athi reconstruction.

IF IRANIAN leaders decide to begin a political dialogue with Washington, their most difficult task will be to persuade their colleagues that Iranian national security will be enhanced as a result of its abandonment of terrorism and its nuclear weapons program. Iran lives in a nuclear neighborhood, and Israel, Pakistan and India stand as evidence of the nuclear asymmetries it faces. So long as a U.S.-Iranian dialogue focuses on these asymmetries, little progress is likely. Israel will not negotiate about its bomb until at least a generation of peace between itself and its neighbors has passed. Likewise, Pakistan will not forsake the bomb so long as India is perceived as a threat, and India, always concerned about China, will not abandon its bomb until the United States, Russia, China, the UK and France do likewise. Here, of course, we verge on fantasy.

It is therefore unrealistic for Iran to expect a nuclear quid pro quo from others for its own restraint. That is why carrots are particularly important. If Iran ends military and financial support to terrorist groups, signs the additional NPT protocol and complies with the statutes of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the carrots Washington offers in response should be considerable. At the least, the United States should move to resolve bilateral issues, including the return of financial assets held since the revolution and the end of executive and legislative trade sanctions. More ambitiously, the U.S. government should be prepared to work with Iran in developing investment opportunities in the region, including energy projects.

It is therefore unrealistic for Iran to expect a nuclear quid pro quo from others for its own restraint. That is why carrots are particularly important. If Iran ends military and financial support to terrorist groups, signs the additional NPT protocol and complies with the statutes of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the carrots Washington offers in response should be considerable. At the least, the United States should move to resolve bilateral issues, including the return of financial assets held since the revolution and the end of executive and legislative trade sanctions. More ambitiously, the U.S. government should be prepared to work with Iran in developing investment opportunities in the region, including energy projects.

This is why the Bush Administration must eventually address Iran's security needs if Tehran's support for terrorism is to be stopped and its bomb is to be put on hold. It is unrealistic to expect Iran to stop its missile program or slow down the modernization of its conventional forces absent a new cooperative regional security environment. For it is not only weapons of mass destruction that determine security priorities. The future of the U.S. military presence in the Arab world and the size and configuration of Iraq's restructured armed forces will also influence Iranian perceptions.

If Iran continues to challenge the United States, the probabilities for dangerous encounters will increase. Iran will never publicly kowtow to American demands, but, if approached with respect, Iran's leaders might rethink their agenda in their own national and political interests. In turn, the United States should welcome rapprochement while continuing its tough message on terrorism and WMD. But U.S. talk of destabilizing the regime is dangerous. If the opportunity for cooperation is missed, the likelihood of an Iranian bomb will increase and, at an indeterminate time, a confrontation will materialize. This would be good for nothing and no one. It therefore would be an act of enlightened self-interest for the United States to engage in imaginative diplomacy to prevent it from happening.

Geoffrey Kemp is director of Regional Strategic Programs at the Nixon Center. He was Special Assistant to the President for the Middle East during the first Reagan Administration.

Essay Types: Essay